Mitchell Hamline Law Review
Volume 44

Issue 2

Article 1

2018

Justiciability of State Law School Segregation Claims
Will Stancil
Jim Hilbert
Mitchell Hamline School of Law, jim.hilbert@mitchellhamline.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Education Law Commons, Law and Race
Commons, and the Law and Society Commons

Recommended Citation
Stancil, Will and Hilbert, Jim (2018) "Justiciability of State Law School Segregation Claims," Mitchell
Hamline Law Review: Vol. 44 : Iss. 2 , Article 1.
Available at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol44/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law Reviews and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open
Access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mitchell
Hamline Law Review by an authorized administrator of
Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information,
please contact sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

JUSTICIABILITY OF STATE LAW SCHOOL
SEGREGATION CLAIMS
Will Stancil† and Jim Hilbert††
I.
II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

INTRODUCTION...................................................................... 400
BACKGROUND ON SCHOOLS .................................................. 402
A. Legal Basis of Public Education...................................... 402
B. Growth of Inequality in Public Education......................... 406
CORRECTING SCHOOL DISPARITIES WITH LITIGATION .......... 410
A. Federal Courts .............................................................. 410
B. Shifting to State Law Claims .......................................... 416
C. State Law Segregation Claims ......................................... 422
1. Sheff .................................................................... 422
2. Minnesota Cases ..................................................... 424
BACKGROUND ON JUSTICIABILITY .......................................... 427
A. Basic Principles and Federal Law.................................... 428
B. Justiciability in State Courts ........................................... 430
C. Application to Educational Adequacy Lawsuits ................. 432
D. When Have Adequacy Claims Been Found Nonjusticiable? . 434
1. Nebraska................................................................ 435
2. Oklahoma .............................................................. 436
3. Pennsylvania ......................................................... 436
4. Indiana ................................................................. 437
5. Iowa...................................................................... 438
6. Illinois................................................................... 438
ARE STATE LAW SEGREGATION CLAIMS JUSTICIABLE? ........... 439
A. Applying Baker v. Carr to State Law Segregation Claims ... 440
1. Baker Factor #1 – Textually Demonstrable Commitment 441
2. Baker Factor #2 – Lack of Standards......................... 444
3. Baker Factor #3 – Initial Policy Determination............ 448
B. Judicial Competence to Resolve Segregation Suits ............... 450
CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 453

399

400

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

I.

[Vol. 44:2

INTRODUCTION

Courts have always been the final repository of hope for parents
and students who feel that their schools are consigning them to
second-class citizenship.1 In the United States, no modern
educational injustice has a longer or more abusive history than racial
segregation,2 and its effective redress has proven all but impossible
without occasional judicial intervention.3 Now, concerned parents
are finding new legal avenues towards desegregating their schools,
by relying on state courts and constitutions.4 But there are warning
signs that those courts may decide—for the first time ever—that

†
Will Stancil is an attorney and Research Fellow at the Institute on
Metropolitan Opportunity.
†† Jim Hilbert is an Associate Professor of Law at Mitchell Hamline School of
Law.1. See MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY
THROUGH THE STATE COURTS 5 (2009) (“Only with court involvement has our nation
made significant inroads into our intractable educational inequities.”); Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 111
(2004) (“[T]he simple reality is that without judicial action equal educational
opportunity will never exist.”).
2. In the words of Martin Luther King, Jr., “[s]egregation is a glaring evil. . . .
Segregation is nothing but slavery covered up with certain niceties of complexity.”
Martin Luther King, Jr., Facing the Challenge of a New Age, Address at the First
Annual Institute on Non-Violence and Social Change, in Montgomery, Ala., (Dec.
3, 1956) in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR. 142 (James M. Washington ed., 1991). According to a recent study
by the Government Accounting Office, not only is school segregation still a
problem in American schools, it is increasing. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-16-345, K–12 EDUCATION: BETTER USE OF INFORMATION COULD
HELP AGENCIES IDENTIFY DISPARITIES AND ADDRESS RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 12
(2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676745.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]
(“Specifically, according to our analysis of [the Department of] Education’s data,
the number of schools where 90 to 100 percent of the students were eligible for free
or reduced-price lunch and 90 to 100 percent of the students were Black or Hispanic
grew by 143 percent from school years 2000-01 to 2013-14.”).
3. In the absence of judicial intervention, policy makers seldom do anything
to address segregated schools. See Erica Frankenberg & Chinh Q. Le, The PostParents Involved Challenge: Confronting Extralegal Obstacles to Integration, 69 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1015, 1021 (2008) (“[S]cores of school districts and communities . . . have
essentially offered no strategy for or even intention of addressing racial, ethnic, and
socioeconomic isolation in their schools”).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 102–57 (describing desegregation cases
based on state constitutional law).
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claims of racial segregation fall outside the purview of the judicial
system.5
Over several decades, education advocates have developed
“educational adequacy” lawsuits as a vehicle for educational
reforms.6 While the claims in these suits vary, they all share a basic
structure.7 Educational adequacy lawsuits assert that a state’s
constitution creates either a legislative obligation to provide an
education with particular characteristics, or a fundamental right to
education.8 Plaintiffs in these suits then allege that some defect in a
state’s K–12 school system results in a failure to meet those
requirements, or else violates that fundamental right. In doing so,
the plaintiffs seek to override the legislatively-developed educational
system to correct the inequity.9
Most often, the asserted defect is funding inequality or
insufficiency, such as a state’s school funding formula that prevents
constitutionally adequate funding.10 But other claims have proven
viable as well. One such claim is a segregation claim. Segregation,
particularly racial segregation, is the grandparent of all educational
inequality in the United States.11 As long as parents have been
fighting for fairer schools, segregation has been at the heart of those
fights.12 Although few in number, educational adequacy segregation

5. See Lia Epperson, Civil Rights Remedies in Higher Education: Jurisprudential
Limitations and Lost Moments in Time, 23 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 343, 372
(2017) (“As a result of shifts in the Supreme Court composition and social and
political climate, the Supreme Court disfavors court-based remedies altogether,
favoring only limited, forward-looking ‘diversity’ rationales.”).
6. See William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Reexamination of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1283–96 (2003) (detailing the history of such cases
involving educational adequacy lawsuits).
7. See infra Part II.B–C (describing state-based education reform cases).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Ken Gormley, Education as a Fundamental Right: Building a New
Paradigm, 2 F. ON PUB. POL’Y 207, 214–15 (2006), http://forumonpublicpolicy.com/
vol2no2.edlaw/gormley.pdf (cataloging cases where state supreme courts
invalidated state education systems for violating state constitutions).
10. See Koski, supra note 6, at 1203–09 (discussing different theories of school
finance litigation).
11. Racial segregation in our schools precedes the civil war and dates back to
the early 1800s. The most famous early case upholding school segregation is from
1849 in Boston. See Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 205 (1849) (upholding a school
system that maintained schools for the “exclusive instruction of white children”).
12. See id.
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lawsuits stand out.13 They are a novel mechanism for attacking a
morally and politically evocative problem against which previous
legal remedies have sometimes fallen short.14
However, educational adequacy lawsuits have met resistance,
and segregation claims are no exception.15 In recent years, there
have been indications that some courts have come to see the
education system as a policy consideration for the legislature,
resulting in the dismissal of education clause suits under the
principle of justiciability.16
This article addresses the intersection of justiciability, education
clause claims, and segregation. It will argue that education clause
claims are often justiciable, and that education clause claims based
on racial segregation are particularly justiciable.17 Part I provides
background on the historic roots of education policy and
educational inequality.18 Part II describes historical efforts to secure
integrated and equitable education from federal and state courts.19
Part III summarizes the doctrine of justiciability and analyzes cases
in which it has been held to prevent education clause claims in state
courts.20 Part IV shows how the harms of segregation form a special
case that supports the justiciability of education clause claims.21
II. BACKGROUND ON SCHOOLS
A.

Legal Basis of Public Education

Education has always been one of the core functions of state
government.22 While the word “education” does not appear in the
13. See Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of Courts
in Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 STAN. J. C.R. &
C.L. 83, 95 n.53 (2010) (discussing educational adequacy lawsuits).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 100–01 (discussing the failure of federal
courts to effectively address school segregation).
15. Id.
16. See Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 13, at 95–103 (chronicling growing
justiciability concerns in education adequacy litigation).
17. See infra Part V.
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (“Providing public schools
ranks at the very apex of the function of a State.”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S
483, 493 (1954) (“[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and
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federal Constitution,23 all fifty states have explicit language relating
to education in their state constitutions.24 States regard education
not just as an imperative state function, but revere it as uniquely
important among the state’s other responsibilities.25 As the Vermont
Supreme Court recognized, “[o]nly one governmental service—
public education—has ever been accorded [such] constitutional
status.”26 Other states share this same perspective.27 Because the
federal Constitution does not contain an education clause, there is
no federal constitutional supremacy limiting what states can derive
from their state constitutions.28
State constitutions require legislatures to create education
systems.29 There is considerable variation among the states in their
local governments.”). State supreme courts agree. As the West Virginia Supreme
Court held, “[o]ur Constitution manifests, throughout, the people’s clear mandate
to the Legislature, that public education is a prime function of our State
government.” Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 884 (W. Va. 1979). State constitutions
often clearly articulate such mandates. For example, the Washington Constitution
states “[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the
education of all children residing within its borders.” WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
23. See Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 681 (“[T]here is, of course, no specific reference
to public education in the United States Constitution . . . .”); see also San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education is not among the
rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.”).
24. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State Constitutional Law, 34
RUTGERS L.J. 1013, 1087 n.532 (2003) (listing all fifty states’ education clauses); see
also Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education
in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 814 (1985) (“The most direct sources of the duty
to educate are state constitutions.”).
25. See Shaman, supra note 24 at 1088 n.532 (“[Education is] the essential
prerequisite that allows our citizens to be able to appreciate, claim and effectively
realize their established rights.”).
26. Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 392 (Vt. 1997).
27. See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 492 (Ark.
2002) (“[E]ducation has been of paramount concern to the citizens of this state
since the state’s inception is beyond dispute. It is safe to say that no program of state
government takes precedence over it.”); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d
1353, 1356 (N.H. 1997) (“[P]ublic education differs from all other services of the
State. No other governmental service plays such a seminal role in developing and
maintaining a citizenry.”); McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d
516, 554 (Mass. 1993) (“The crux of the Commonwealth’s duty lies in its obligation
to educate all of its children.”).
28. See Gormley, supra note 9, at 213 (“The federal Constitution sets the floor,
beneath which states may not fall. But a state may always go beyond that floor, and
grant more expansive rights under the state constitution.”).
29. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (requiring the legislature to “establish
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constitutional language and the way they treat educational rights.30
At one end of the spectrum are the twenty-one state “establishment
provisions,” which simply require states to establish a free public
school system “and nothing more.”31 In the middle are eighteen state
“quality provisions,” which direct states to provide an educational
system “of a specific quality.”32 Further along that continuum, there
are six state “strong mandate” provisions that both establish a level
of quality and provide a strong mandate to achieve it.33 Finally, at the
a general and uniform system of public schools”).
30. State education clauses can be divided into four categories based upon the
level of duty imposed by the text. Ratner, supra note 24, at 814 n.143–46 (citing
Erica Black Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right To Bilingual Education, 9
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 52, 66–70 (1974)); see also William E. Thro, Judicial Humility:
The Enduring Legacy of Rose v. Council for Better Education, 98 KY. L.J. 717, 725
(2010) [hereinafter Thro, Judicial Humility] (refining Grubb and Ratner’s basic
framework). See generally, William E. Thro & Carlee Poston Escue, Doubt or Deference:
Comparing the South Dakota and Washington School Finance Decisions, 281 EDUC. L. REP.
771, 771 n.3 (2012).
31. See Thro, Judicial Humility, supra note 30, at 726 (listing states with
establishment provisions for education in their constitutions). A typical example of
an establishment provision clause is Tennessee’s, which states that “[t]he General
Assembly shall provide for the maintenance, support and eligibility standards of a
system of free public schools.” TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12. See Ratner, supra note 24,
at 815 (“Provisions in the first group contain only general education language and
are exemplified by the Connecticut Constitution: ‘There shall always be free public
elementary and secondary schools in the state.’” (citing CONN CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1)).
32. See Thro, Judicial Humility, supra note 30, at 726. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art.
XIII, § 1 (“The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly upon
the intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the legislature to establish a general
and uniform system of public schools. The legislature shall make such provisions by
taxation or otherwise as will secure a thorough and efficient system of public schools
throughout the state.”); see also Ratner, supra note 24, at 815 (“Provisions in the
second group emphasize the quality of public education.”). The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals discussed and subcategorized this type of provision at
length. See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 865–78 (W. Va. 1979). Generally, the
specific quality includes either “thorough,” “efficient,” or both. Id. As the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals observed, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania require “thorough and efficient” systems; Colorado, Idaho,
and Montana require “thorough” systems; and Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois,
Kentucky, and Texas require “efficient” systems. Id. at 865.
33. See Thro, Judicial Humility, supra note 30, at 726. Provisions in the third
group contain a stronger and more specific education mandate than those in the
first and second groups. Ratner, supra note 24, at 815. A typical clause is the Rhode
Island Constitution, which requires the legislature “to promote public schools and
to adopt all means which they may deem necessary and proper to secure . . . the
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far end are five state “high duty provisions,” which require states to
place education “above other governmental functions such as
highways or welfare.”34
Importantly, regardless of the variations in the textual language,
every state constitution imposes some duty on the state to provide a
minimum level of public education to its children.35 Even states with
arguably the weakest provisions require, at a minimum, that the state
“maintain[s] free public schools.”36 For example, the Tennessee
Constitution states that “[t]he General Assembly shall provide for
the maintenance, support and eligibility standards of a system of free
public schools.”37 States with constitutional text on the other end of
the spectrum go much further. The Washington Supreme Court
explained that its constitutional provision “does not merely seek to
broadly declare policy, explain goals, or designate objectives to be
accomplished. It is declarative of a constitutionally imposed [d]uty.”38
In addition to the legislative duties related to education, some
states have determined that education is a fundamental right.
However, there is again variation among states.39 Fifteen states, for
advantages . . . of education.” R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1. See CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1
(“A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the
preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall
encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and
agricultural improvement.”).
34. Thro, Judicial Humility, supra note 30, at 726. The provisions in the fourth
group contain the strongest commitment to education. Ratner, supra note 24, at
816. An example is the Washington State Constitution’s education clause, which
provides that “[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for
the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or
preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.” WASH. CONST art. IX, § 1.
Although other states have education clauses that qualify for this category,
Washington is the only one that makes the duty “paramount.” See Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 84 (Wash. 1978).
35. See Ratner, supra note 24, at 816 (explaining how “[a]ll four categories [of
constitutional text] impose duties on the state to provide some form of public
education”).
36. Id.
37. TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; see also Ratner, supra note 24, at 816 (citing the
New York and Connecticut constitutions).
38. Id. at 816 (quoting Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 85 (emphasis
added)). See GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“The provision of an adequate public
education for the citizens shall be a primary obligation of the State of Georgia.”).
39. There also appears to be at least a loose relationship between the text of
the constitution and whether state courts have found education to be a fundamental
right. See Thro, Judicial Humility, supra note 30, at 727 (“[I]f the text of the

406

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:2

example, already consider education a fundamental right through
judicial action or constitutional amendment,40 while twenty-two
states have interpreted their education clause to confer an
affirmative obligation on the state to provide an adequate
education.41 Without exception, the right to education under state
constitutional law has required a minimal guarantee of quality
education.42
B.

Growth of Inequality in Public Education

Rights and obligations aside, in practice, schools often fail to
provide equal opportunity for quality education to students.43 Racial
disparities, present since the days of formal statutory segregation,
continue to be both dramatic and entrenched.44 For example,
African American students’ achievement on the National
Assessment of Educational Progress lags twenty-seven scaled points
behind white students in reading and thirty-one points in math.45
constitution is nothing more than an establishment provision, then there is no
quality standard or fundamental right.”).
40. See Gormley, supra note 9, at 219 (“The highest courts of at least fourteen
states, at one time or another, have declared that education is a fundamental right
under their state constitutions.”). The list includes Alabama, Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Tennessee,
Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at 219 n.63. “Florida amended
its Constitution in 1998 to specifically provide that ‘the education of children is a
fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida.’” Id. (quoting FLA. CONST.
art. IX, § 1). Professor Gormley also notes that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
stated that education is a fundamental right under the State Constitution. Id. (citing
Sch. Dist. of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass’n, 667 A.2d 5, 9 (Pa. 1995)). But
that court later seemed to retreat from that position. Id. (citing Marrero ex rel.
Tabalas v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110, 113 (Pa. 1999)).
41. Anne Gordon, California Constitutional Law: The Right to an Adequate
Education, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 323, 351–52 (2016). Importantly, “only a minority of
states have found that their education clauses confer no substantive right.” Id. at
352.
42. See id. at 352–53 (“Where a state’s high court has found a right to education,
none has found that right to exist without a guarantee of quality.”).
43. See Derek Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the
Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C.L. REV. 373, 374 (2012).
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2009, app. A
at 153 tbl.A-12-2, 157 tbl.A-13-2 (2009)), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/
2009081.pdf. In a slightly earlier analysis, researchers found little to no change in
math and reading achievement gaps for the previous fifteen years. See U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC.,THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2007, 39, 144 tbl.14-1 (2007),
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This disparity is equivalent to two to three years of learning.46 The
so-called “achievement gap”47 between white students and most
students of color has been substantial for decades.48
Segregated schools are largely to blame for these disparities.49 A
recent study by the United States Government Accounting Office
found that such disparities along racial lines “are particularly acute
among schools with the highest concentrations” of students of color
and low-income students.50 Students of color who attend segregated
schools score lower on achievement tests and other learning
assessments.51 Segregated schools have lower graduation rates, lower

https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007064.pdf.
46. See CHRISTOPHER LUBIENSKI & SARAH THEULE LUBIENSKI, NAT’L CTR. OF
PRIVATIZATION IN EDUC., CHARTER, PRIVATE, PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIC
ACHIEVEMENT: NEW EVIDENCE FROM NAEP MATHEMATICS DATA 5 (2006),
http://www.ncspe.org/publications_files/OP111.pdf (explaining how to interpret
achievement gaps on the NAEP). Stated differently, African-American eighthgraders are earning scores equivalent to white students in sixth grade. Black, supra
note 43, at 404.
47. See Cassandra Abbott, Note, The “Race to the Top” and the Inevitable Fall to the
Bottom: How the Principles of the “Campaign for Fiscal Equity” and Economic Integration
Can Help Close the Achievement Gap, 2013 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 93, 113 n.137 (2013)
(“The term ‘achievement gap’ has a derogatory connotation in the sense that it
implies that the ‘gap’ is largely a student-centered problem.”).
48. See Amy Stuart Wells et al., The Space Between School Desegregation Court Orders
and Outcomes: The Struggle to Challenge White Privilege, 90 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1721–22
(2004).
49. Decades of data confirm segregation undermines student achievement. See
GARY ORFIELD & ERICA FRANKENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, BROWN AT 60: GREAT
PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 37 (“The consensus of nearly
60 years of social science research on the harms of school segregation is clear:
separate remains extremely unequal.”). Of course, other forms of racism are
responsible as well. As just one example, the federal government recently concluded
that racism was a “real problem” in contributing to the racial disparities in student
discipline. See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., JOINT “DEAR
COLLEAGUE” LETTER ON NONDISCRIMINATORY ADMINISTRATION OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
4 (2014) (“[I]n our investigations we have found cases where African-American
students were disciplined more harshly and more frequently because of their race
than similarly situated white students. In short, racial discrimination in school
discipline is a real problem.”).
50. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 42.
51. See Roslyn Arlin Mickelson & Martha Bottia, Integrated Education and
Mathematics Outcomes: A Synthesis of Social Science Research, 88 N.C. L. REV. 993, 1043
(2010); Stephanie Southworth, Examining the Effects of School Composition on North
Carolina Student Achievement Over Time, 18 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, 24
(2010); Eric Hanushek et al., New Evidence About Brown v. Board of Education: The
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college attendance rates, and students from such schools are less
likely to obtain a four-year degree.52
One reason for segregated schools’ negative impact on student
achievement is the disparity in resources.53 In a joint policy paper on
the importance of diversity, the United States Departments of
Education and Justice acknowledged that segregated schools are far
more likely to have fewer and lower quality educational resources,
such as fewer classroom materials, deficient technology and facilities,
and less challenging curricula.54 Segregated schools are also more
likely to be staffed with less qualified teachers and suffer a higher
degree of teacher turnover.55
However, resource disparities alone do not account for all the
harms of racial segregation.56 Segregation also reinforces negative
Complex Effects of School Racial Composition on Achievement, 27 J. LAB. ECON. 349, 351
(2009).
52. See Suzanne E. Eckes, Aaron J. Butler, and Natasha M. Wilson, Brown v.
Board of Education’s 60th Anniversary: Still No Cause for a Celebration, 311 EDUC. L. REP.
1, 36 (2015) (discussing the correlation between segregated schools and college
attendance); ORFIELD & FRANKENBERG, supra note 49, at 39 (discussing the
correlation between segregated and high school dropout and college success).
Segregated education also impacts student attitudes and other benefits. See john a.
powell, Segregation and Education Inadequacy in the Twin Cities Public Schools, 17
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 337, 343 (1996) (“Homogenous education fails to
prepare students of all races for life in a multicultural society. Segregated schools
deny all students the benefit of exposure to diverse views and perspectives.”).
Students in segregated schools are separated from important networks that have
lasting impacts on future employment opportunities. See Derek Black, The Case for
the New Compelling Government Interest: Improving Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C. L. REV.
923, 953 (2002) (“Attending racially diverse schools opens up social networks to
racial minorities, which often lead to additional job opportunities. As these benefits
increase, they will perpetuate themselves naturally, and further integrate the job
market and social networks.”).
53. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDANCE ON THE
VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY AND AVOID RACIAL ISOLATION IN
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS 1 (2011) [hereinafter DOJ & DOE JOINT
GUIDANCE], http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/guidance-ese-20111
1.html. Students in segregated schools are also subjected to more suspensions and
disciplinary actions. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 21–24.
54. See DOJ & DOE JOINT GUIDANCE, supra note 53, at 1.
55. Id.
56. PHILIP TEGELER, ROSLYN ARLIN MICKELSON & MARTHA BOTTIA, NAT’L
COALITION ON SCH. DIVERSITY, RESEARCH BRIEF: WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT SCHOOL
INTEGRATION, COLLEGE ATTENDANCE, AND THE REDUCTION OF POVERTY 1 (2010),
http://school-diversity.org/pdf/DiversityResearchBriefNo4.pdf (discussing how
students at integrated schools have higher education aspirations and lower levels of
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social and interpersonal mechanisms which harm children.57 For
example, segregated schools lack access to professional and
academic social networks, which are a critical aspect in educational
advancement, college attendance, and ultimately employment.58 In
addition, segregation reduces children’s exposure to people from
different social and ethnic backgrounds, which impairs their ability
to form cross-group or interracial friendships and working
relationships.59
Segregation’s impact on student achievement is, in part, a
consequence of the strong relationship between racial isolation and
poverty concentration.60 As many as half of all students in highly
racially segregated schools are in schools that are also impacted by
concentrated poverty.61 Concentrated poverty, on its own, negatively
impacts educational achievement.62 For instance, a study by the
National Center for Education Statistics shows lower achievement
among students in high poverty schools.63 In 2007, the average

violence than their peers at racially-isolated schools).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See CAROLE LEARNED-MILLER, NAT’L COALITION ON SCH. DIVERSITY RESEARCH
BRIEF: HOW TO SUPPORT THE SOCIAL-EMOTIONAL WELL-BEING OF STUDENTS OF COLOR
(2017), http://school-diversity.org/pdf/DiversityResearchBrief11.pdf.
60. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD ET AL., BROWN AT 62: SCHOOL SEGREGATION BY RACE,
POVERTY AND STATE, 1–2 (2016) (describing the link between the two and finding
that “[m]any schools are affected by both at the same time. . . .”); Kristi L. Bowman,
A New Strategy for Pursuing Racial and Ethnic Equality in Public Schools, 1 DUKE F. FOR L.
& SOC. CHANGE 47, 55–56 (2009) (“[T]he more black and brown a school’s
population is, the more likely it is that students in that school are predominantly
poor.”).
61. See ORFIELD & FRANKENBERG, supra note 49, at 15. “This means that these
students face almost total isolation not only from white and Asian students but also
from middle class peers as well.” Id.
62. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, 85 N.C. L. REV.
1545, 1547 (2007) (“Researchers have consistently found that schools with high
concentrations of poverty present, on average, a very difficult environment for
student learning.”); GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 8 (“An extensive body of research
over the past 10 years shows a clear link between schools’ socioeconomic (or
income) composition and student academic outcomes. That is, the nationally
representative studies we reviewed (published from 2004 to 2014) showed that
schools with higher concentrations of students from low-income families were

generally associated with worse outcomes, and schools with higher
concentrations of students from middle- and high-income families were generally
associated with better outcomes.”).
63. See The CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2007, supra note 45, at 18.
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reading and math scores for fourth- and eighth-grade students in
schools where fifty-one to seventy-five percent of students were
eligible for free or reduced-price lunches was roughly two grade
levels lower than students in schools where only eleven to twenty-five
percent of students were eligible for discounted lunches.64 While a
student’s individual poverty status has some impact on achievement,
the overall level of poverty in the school is a more powerful
contributor.65 The combination of both racial and economic
segregation creates significant barriers to learning for students of
color trapped in “double segregation.”66
III. CORRECTING SCHOOL DISPARITIES WITH LITIGATION
A.

Federal Courts

Segregation has been at the center of school litigation since at
least 1930.67 That year, the NAACP commissioned the “Margold
64. Id.
65. See Robert A. Garda, Jr., Coming Full Circle: The Journey from Separate but Equal
to Separate and Unequal Schools, 2 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 44 (2007)
(reviewing studies and concluding that “the socioeconomic status of the student
body is the most important, school-related factor for academic success, even more
important than an individual student’s wealth”); Kahlenberg, supra note 62, at 1549
(“Low-income students do not typically perform as well academically as middle class
children, with one striking exception: low-income students attending middle class
schools perform better, on average, than middle class students in high-poverty
schools.”).
66. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 60, at 1. For example, a recent study analyzed
more than 100 million test scores from 2009 to 2012 of public school children,
grades three through eight, in over 300 metropolitan areas to determine whether it
is “the racial or socioeconomic composition of schools that drives the persistent
association between segregation and achievement inequality.” Sean F. Reardon,
School Segregation and Racial Academic Achievement Gaps, 2 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC.
SCI. 34, 35 (2016). The resulting data shows “an association between racial school
segregation and achievement gaps, net of many socioeconomic differences between
white and minority families . . . [which is] driven by the strong association between
racial segregation per se and racial differences in school poverty.” Id. at 50. The
study concludes that “the racial difference in the proportion of students’
schoolmates who are poor is the key dimension of segregation driving th[e]
association [between segregation and achievement gaps].” Id. at 19. Of course, both
aspects of this segregation have independent impacts. Racial segregation brings its
own special sort of negative impact on learning. See powell, supra note 52, at 344
(“[E]conomic accounts do not tell the whole story. . . . [R]acial segregation creates
harms independent of economic segregation.”).
67. See Leland B. Ware, Setting the Stage for Brown: The Development and
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Report,” which carefully plotted a legal campaign against
educational segregation as the first step in a decades-long battle
against Jim Crow in the courts.68 For years, plaintiffs attacking school
segregation were forced to rely on federal courts and federal
constitutional rights, for the simple reason that they could not
expect a fair hearing from the state courts which enforced the very
Jim Crow laws they were fighting.69
The modern root of school desegregation law is Brown v. Board
of Education.70 In Brown, the Supreme Court found that “[s]eparate
educational facilities are inherently unequal,” and that intentional
government operation of such facilities violates equal protection
principles.71 The correct application of these principles was
unaddressed in the Brown decision, and follow-up cases created
opportunities for districts to delay implementation.72 These
omissions, combined with “massive resistance” in some parts of the

Implementation of the NAACP’s School Desegregation Campaign, 1930–1950, 52 MERCER
L. REV. 631, 632 (2001).
68. Id. at 632, 640 (detailing the efforts and describing the Margold Report as
“the foundation of the NAACP’s strategy against segregation”); MARK V. TUSHNET,
THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950, 27–28
(1987) (explaining how the Margold Report convinced the NAACP to attack
segregation directly rather than argue for equalization of funding).
69. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American and South African Courts:
Similarities and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 479, 521 (1990) (documenting “courtenforced racism” in Jim Crow-era courtrooms, including “refusal to accord black
witnesses the civilities customarily accorded to white witnesses; attacks on the
credibility of blacks as witnesses or accuseds; prosecutorial appeals to fear of
violence by blacks; reliance on claims that racial minorities have a propensity toward
violence; use of racist comments; and overtly racist conduct by judges.”).
70. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
71. Id. at 495 (“Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the
actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of,
deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
72. Much of the blame lies with the Court’s declaration in Brown v. Board of
Education 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [Brown II], that district courts issue “orders and
decrees . . . as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed. . . .” Id. at 301 (emphasis added). The
phrase “with all deliberate speed,” in particular, was taken by many districts as giving
permission to equivocate on the issue. Indeed, ten years after Brown, schools were
nearly as segregated as they were before the Brown decision. See ORFIELD &
FRANKENBERG, supra note 49, at 4 (“In the great majority of the several thousand
southern districts nothing had been done.”).
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South and apathy about integration elsewhere, ensured that
progress on desegregation remained essentially nonexistent in many
areas for more than a decade after Brown.73 By the late 1960s, the
courts began confronting the lack of progress on school
integration.74 In doing so, the courts expanded school desegregation
law in unique and unprecedented ways.75
Federal desegregation law is built out of the need to forbid,
prevent, and remedy the operation of an intentionally segregated
school system—or what became known as a “dual system”—in
violation of equal protection rights as established in Brown.76
However, state and local resistance to judicial interventions became
so extraordinary and widespread that almost every aspect of these
interventions was eventually adjudicated before the United States
Supreme Court.77 Consequently, the Court was forced to develop a
robust, highly practical body of law that dealt very specifically with
almost every dimension of the elimination of segregation in
schools.78
The Supreme Court has defined “dual systems” broadly.79 The
term does not describe any single policy, or even a constellation of
73. See generally Robert R. Merhige, Jr., The Promise of Equality: Reflections on the
Post-Brown Era in Virginia, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 11 (2004); Davison M. Douglas, The
Rhetoric of Moderation: Desegregating the South During the Decade After Brown, 89 NW. U.
L. REV. 92 (1994).
74. See generally Charles L. Zelden, From Rights to Resources: The Southern Federal
District Courts and the Transformation of Civil Rights in Education, 1968–1974, 32 AKRON
L. REV. 471, 471–72 (1999).
75. Id. at 479–80 (discussing the “commitment within the federal judicial
hierarchy to use judicial powers to achieve ‘equality of results’ in civil rights
matters”). Federal courts focused “their initial efforts on education,” using “the
medium of race-based reallocation of resources. Id. “The effect of this shift in Civil
Rights enforcement priorities away from the individual toward the group—and
from color-blind nondiscrimination to preferential (i.e. color-based)
discrimination—was explosive.” Id.
76. See, e.g., Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968) (“It was such dual
systems that, 14 years ago, Brown I held unconstitutional, and, a year later, Brown II
held must be abolished. . . .”).
77. See Zelden, supra note 74, at 472 (“Few in the South accepted the Supreme
Court’s offer in Brown II of a voluntary process of desegregation in 1955, and this
position of ‘massive opposition’ to civil rights reforms continued into the 1960s.”).
78. See A.B.A., TIMELINE OF SUPREME COURT SCHOOL-DESEGREGATION CASES
FROM BROWN TO FISHER, A.B.A. ANNUAL MEETING (2013), https://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/aba-ann
ual2013/written_materials/20_lessons_in_leadership.authcheckdam. pdf.
79. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 245–46 (1991).
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policies, but instead the practice (varying in its particulars across
regions or districts) of educating children of different races
separately.80 In a typical school desegregation case, the finding that
a government entity operates a dual system acts as a starting pistol
which creates an obligation for the entity—or, if need be, the courts
themselves—to dismantle the dual system and create a “unitary”
system.81 While intentional (“de jure”) segregation is the only
segregation proscribed by the federal Constitution, dual systems
were treated in their totality as de jure segregation.82
The United States Supreme Court held that dual systems must
be eliminated “root and branch.”83 They are not cured until
authorities, or the courts themselves, have purged both the root of
intentional government discrimination and the branched-off,
second-order effects that cause additional harm and reinforce the
segregation.84 Thus, after a dual system is identified, its
transformation into a unitary district typically requires the
elimination of most forms of segregation throughout the system,
regardless of whether the proximate cause of that segregation is
government policy.85
Despite this duty to eliminate dual systems, the Supreme Court
placed practical limitations on school segregation remedies, stating
that while vestiges of prior discrimination must be eliminated,
80. See, e.g., id. at 262–64 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The evil to be remedied
in the dismantling of a dual system is the ‘[r]acial identification of the system’s
schools.’” (quoting Green v. Cty Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968))).
81. See, e.g., id. at 246 (“Courts have used the terms ‘dual’ to denote a school
system which has engaged in intentional segregation of students by race, and
‘unitary’ to describe a school system which has been brought into compliance with
the command of the Constitution.”).
82. See, e.g., Green, 391 U.S. at 437–38 (“School boards such as the respondent
then operating state-compelled dual systems were nevertheless clearly charged with
the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary
system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.”).
83. Id.
84. See id. at 435; see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 472 (1992) (holding it
is the “school district’s mandatory responsibility to eliminate all vestiges of a dual
system.”).
85. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 213 (1973) (“If the District Court
determines that the Denver school system is a dual school system, respondent
School Board has the affirmative duty to desegregate the entire system root and
branch.”); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)
(“The objective today remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of
state-imposed segregation.”); Green, 391 U.S. at 435.
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districts do have the opportunity to prove that some racial
concentrations are not a consequence of state action.86
Concentrations not rooted in government discrimination need not
be undone under this standard.87 The Supreme Court also created
strong policy limitations, most notably limiting the extension of
remedies across district borders in federal suits.88
Once a court determines a school system is a dual system, its
equitable powers to effect a remedy are expansive.89 If the school
system’s educational authorities are found to have taken any degree
of segregative discrimination, segregation elsewhere in the same
system is presumed intentional.90 Potential remedies include:
arranging for student transportation, monitoring school openings
and closures, monitoring teachers and hirings, and adjusting
attendance boundaries or zones.91 Until unitary status is achieved,
these and other mechanisms remain available.92

86. See, e.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 26 (“In light of the above, it should be clear that
the existence of some small number of one-race, or virtually one-race, schools within
a district is not in and of itself the mark of a system that still practices segregation
by law.”).
87. See id. at 16 (providing that the required “task is to correct . . . the condition
that offends the Constitution”). However, when segregation occurs in a system
where the vestiges of state-sponsored discrimination are elsewhere apparent, the
burden of demonstrating that there is no connection between the two is significant.
See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 211 (“[A] connection between past segregative acts and present
segregation may be present even when not apparent and . . . close examination is
required before concluding that the connection does not exist.”).
88. Perhaps the most-criticized desegregation decision has been Milliken v.
Bradley. 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974) (holding that federal desegregation remedies
cannot include outlying districts not party to the case at hand, absent a showing that
the outlying districts enacted policies with a significant segregative effect in the
central district). By frequently eliminating the ability of segregation plaintiffs to
incorporate whiter and more affluent suburbs, Milliken forced inner-city districts to,
in effect, desegregate themselves—something that became impossible after largescale white flight. See, e.g., Myron Orfield, Milliken, Meredith, and Metropolitan
Segregation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 364, 409–10 (2015).
89. See, e.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 16 (“In default by the school authorities of their
obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad power to
fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school system.”).
90. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208 (“[A] finding of intentionally segregative school
board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system, as in this case, creates a
presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not
adventitious.”).
91. Swann, 402 U.S. at 20–31.
92. Id.
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The Supreme Court laid out rules for when unitary status has
been achieved.93 Factors include whether the district or school
system has engaged in good-faith compliance with their
constitutional obligations and whether vestiges of past
discrimination have been eliminated “to the extent practicable.”94
This is a searching inquiry in which courts look “not only at student
assignments, but ‘to every facet of school operations—faculty, staff,
transportation, extra-curricular activities and facilities.’”95
After finding a dual system, the United States Supreme Court’s
school segregation rules have the practical effect of reducing the
importance of the distinction between de jure (intentional) and de
facto (unintentional) segregation.96 While the end goal remains the
unraveling of government-backed segregation, the Supreme Court
has generally recognized that the distinction between these concepts
can easily blur at the margins.97 The Supreme Court adopted
pragmatic rules that tend to, whenever plausible, treat existing racial
divides as an outgrowth of historic discrimination.98 Doing so was a
critical step in developing functional rules for effectuating
desegregation; other approaches could have been hamstrung by
continual assertions that easily-observed racial isolation was,
nonetheless, the product of private choice.99 In Keyes v. School District

93. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 487, 489–91 (1992); Bd. of Educ. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 246–50 (1991).
94. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249–250 (“The District Court should address itself to
whether the Board had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since
it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated
to the extent practicable.”).
95. Id. at 250 (citing Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968)).
96. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 214–17 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
97. This is because, after an intentionally segregated district is identified, the
Supreme Court has strongly suggested that any existing segregation in that district
should be eliminated as presumptively unconstitutional. For example, the Court has
said that although schools where all students are of one race are not intrinsically
forbidden, they are targets for desegregation. See, e.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 26 (“The
district judge or school authorities should make every effort to achieve the greatest
possible degree of actual desegregation and will thus necessarily be concerned with
the elimination of one-race schools.”).
98. Green, 391 U.S. at 435–36 (discussing how the goal of the Court in these
cases has evolved from “the concern . . . with making an initial break in a longestablished pattern of excluding Negro children from schools attended by white
children” to “[t]he transition to a unitary, nonracial system of public education.”).
99. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 116 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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No. 1, the high-water mark for expansive application of Brown, the
Court stated: “We have never suggested that plaintiffs in school
desegregation cases must bear the burden of proving the elements
of de jure segregation as to each and every school or each and every
student within the school system.”100
Despite the availability of powerful desegregation remedies and
the persistence of segregation, enforcement of federal
desegregation rules has waned greatly.101 Access to these remedies
relied on plaintiffs successfully persuading a court that a district is
being operated as a dual system.102 Because overt racial assignment
policies and other obvious manifestations of discrimination have
become less frequent, proving the existence of a dual system has
become more challenging.103 In other words, an array of powerful
legal tools for evaluating and reducing school segregation remain
available,104 but lie dormant as federal Equal Protection claims
become harder to prove.
B.

Shifting to State Law Claims

The “school finance” litigation movement developed largely
because of the lack of progress in desegregation as litigators shifted
the focus from the demographics of schools to the disparities in

100. 413 U.S. at 200.
101. For example, one 2000 study found that while dozens of desegregation
orders remained open across the country, “most cases suffer from extreme
neglect—little activity will occur for years, if not decades.” Wendy Parker, The Future
of School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157, 1160 (2000).
102. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200 (1973).
103. Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Achieving Equality of Educational Opportunity in the
Wake of Judicial Retreat from Race Sensitive Remedies: Lessons from North Carolina, 52 AM.
U. L. REV. 1477, 1478–79 (2003).
104. See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Civil Rights in a Desegregating America,
83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 1393–1411 (2016); Krista Kauble, Litigating Keyes: The New
Opportunity for Litigators to Achieve Desegregation, 31 CHICANA/O-LATINA/O L. REV. 103
(2012) (discussing how Keyes serves as a unique tool for litigators seeking reform on
behalf of Latinx students); Kimberly C. West, A Desegregation Tool That Backfired:
Magnet School and Classroom Desegregation, 102 YALE L.J. 2567, 2575–77 (1993).
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funding between schools.105 The first “wave”106 of this resourcesbased litigation relied on federal equal protection theories.107 In
particular, the success of Serrano v. Priest, 108 in which the California
Supreme Court held that the state’s school finance system violated
the equal protection guarantees of both the California and United
States Constitutions, inspired similar lawsuits, in more than thirty
other states, mostly based on the federal Constitution.109
Two years after Serrano, the United States Supreme Court in
Rodriguez ended the use of federal courts for addressing the wide
funding disparities between wealthy and low-income districts,
concluding the first wave of school finance litigation.110 Litigators
105. See James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 529, 532 n.14 (1999) (“School finance litigation began in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, at a time when the slow pace of desegregation was causing some civil
rights activists to question the efficacy of desegregation as a tool to improve the
educational opportunities of [students of color].”). School desegregation and
school finance litigation shared the same goal of improving educational
opportunity for low-income students of color. See Goodwin Liu, The Parted Paths of
School Desegregation and School Finance Litigation, 24 L. & INEQ. 81, 81 (2006) (“One
strategy involves redistributing schoolchildren; the other involves redistributing
money. One focuses on race; the other focuses on resources. Despite these
differences, both are united by a common purpose of improving educational
opportunity for the most disadvantaged children—in particular, those who are
minority and poor.”).
106. The idea of categorizing school finance litigation into “waves” originated
with William Thro, a long-time education lawyer and legal scholar on school
litigation. See William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky
and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. &
EDUC. 219, 222–32, 250 (1990). But see Koski, supra note 6, at 1188 (noting how the
so-called “waves” are not actually such distinct categories).
107. Kamina Aliya Pinder, Reconciling Race-Neutral Strategies and Race-Conscious
Objectives: The Potential Resurgence of the Structural Injunction in Education Litigation, 9
STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 247, 256–57 (2013).
108. 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971) (finding that California’s school financing
system “invidiously discriminates against the poor because it makes the quality of a
child’s education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors”).
109. See Betsy Levin, Current Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation: A
Commentary, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1099, 1101 n.11 (1977) (citing nine decisions
throughout the country between 1971 and 1973 that illustrated the success of the
Serrano litigation strategy).
110. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41 (1973)
(“[W]e continue to acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the
expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise
decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues.”); cf. Erwin
Chemerinsky, Making Schools More Separate and Unequal: Parents Involved in
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responded by linking school finance litigation to state constitutional
provisions, something explicitly suggested by both Justice Marshall
(in his Rodriguez dissent)111 and Justice Brennan (in a law review
article).112 The “second wave” of litigation again focused on unequal
spending between districts, but this time using “education clauses”
and state constitutional principles.113 But the second wave included
more losses than wins,114 and even the few victories produced rather
mixed results, often leading to vague remedies overly deferential to
noncompliant legislatures.115 In light of the losses and in response to
the concerns about the lack of compliance by state legislatures,
school finance cases began to wane in the 1980s116—but this was only
a momentary pause.
The “third wave” shifted focus to the “adequacy” of education,
rather than the “equity” of funding, with one state court declaring
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 633, 634
(2014) (“Rodriguez meant that [schools] would be unequal. American public
education is characterized by wealthy, white suburban schools spending a great deal
on education surrounding much poorer black and Latino city schools that spend
much less on education.”).
111. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 133 n.100 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Of course,
nothing in the Court’s decision today should inhibit further review of state
educational funding schemes under state constitutional provisions.”).
112. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 n.38 (1977) (“Recent decisions have also given rise
to some doubt as to the Court’s continuing commitment to the eradication of racial
discrimination in . . . education.”). In this article, written shortly after Rodriguez,
Justice Brennan wrote, “[t]he legal revolution which has brought federal law to the
fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law—
for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.” Id. at 491.
113. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973) (finding the
school finance system unconstitutional after determining that the State failed to
“fulfill[] its obligation to afford all pupils that level of instructional opportunity
which is comprehended by a thorough and efficient system of education for
students,” as required under the state constitution).
114. Of the twenty-two meaningful opinions in school finance cases issued
between 1973 and 1989, less than one-third were victories for plaintiffs. See Koski,
supra note 6, at 1189 (collecting cases and observing that “[t]his round
of . . . litigation proved mostly unsuccessful for plaintiffs”).
115. See Levin, supra note 109, at 1135 (describing the lengthy, repeated
litigation in New Jersey and California trying to enforce school finance victories
against reluctant and slow-moving state legislatures).
116. See Janet D. McDonald et al., School Finance Litigation and Adequacy Studies,
27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 69, 75 (2004) (“[T]he general unwillingness of
courts to find for the plaintiffs in these [second wave] cases encouraged litigants to
move away from arguments based only on funding inequities.”).
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the state’s entire education system unconstitutional.117 The
Kentucky Supreme Court decision in Rose v. Council for Better
Education, Inc. marks one of the largest historical interventions in
education by a state court.118 As sweeping as its order striking down
the entire education system was, the court went even further. The
court provided the legislature with specific criteria on what would
constitute an “efficient” system of common schools, including what
competencies students should receive and what standards a
constitutional school system must uphold.119
The Rose decision paved the way for large successes in the “third
wave” of school finance litigation, commonly known as “adequacy
117. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989) (“This
decision applies to the entire sweep of the system—all its parts and parcels . . . the
whole gamut of the common school system in Kentucky.”). Two other “adequacy”
cases were decided the same year as Rose, adding to the sense that a new era of
education reform litigation was underway. See Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State,
769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391
(Tex. 1989); see also Gormley, supra note 9, at 216 (“In this trilogy of cases, and
others that followed, the courts presumably jettisoned equality analyses under state
constitutions in favor of an “adequacy” analysis in scrapping dysfunctional funding
schemes for public education.”).
118. See Kern Alexander, The Common School Ideal and the Limits of Legislative
Authority, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 341, 342 (1991) (“This ruling constituted one of the
most comprehensive interventions by a state judiciary into the realm of legislative
policymaking for education . . . invalidating 153 years of legislation and legislative
autonomy.”). According to the court in Rose, “Kentucky’s educational effort” was
both “inadequate and well below the national effort.” 790 S.W.2d at 197.
119. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212.
[A]n efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each
and every child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient
oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in
a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of
economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make
informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental
processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his
or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and
knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient
grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her
cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation
for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to
enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii)
sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school
students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding
states, in academics or in the job market.
Id.
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cases.”120 Soon after the Rose decision, state courts in three more
cases directed their legislatures to craft a remedial plan to comply
with the criteria set forth in Rose.121 Litigating “adequacy” rather than
“equity” shifted the focus of state court litigation from ensuring an
equitable balance of resources to securing sufficient resources to
provide every student an “adequate” education.122 This new focus
resulted in many more successful outcomes for plaintiffs than the
prior approach.123 Since Rose, plaintiffs have won about two-thirds
of finance and adequacy cases.124
State-based educational reform litigation (both finance and
adequacy cases) has fallen short of improving system-wide
120. See McDonald et al., supra note 116, at 77 (collecting cases where
“Kentucky’s definition of adequacy has been used directly or served as a substantive
portion of the adequacy definition adopted in several other states”); see also
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 482 (N.Y. 2001) (listing states
that used Rose to interpret their own education clauses).
121. See Koski, supra note 6, at 1273–74 (“Courts in Alabama, Massachusetts, and
New Hampshire addressed the constitutionality of their educational finance systems
for the first time and, citing the Rose decision, declared them unconstitutional under
an adequacy theory. Each of those courts specifically relied on [Rose]’s definition of
‘adequacy’ and sent the matter back to their legislatures to craft a remedial plan in
accordance with that definition.”).
122. See, e.g., DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 746 (Ohio 1997) (“[W]e must
ensure that there is enough money that students have the chance to succeed
because of the educational opportunity provided, not in spite of it. Such an
opportunity requires, at the very least, that all of Ohio’s children attend schools
which are safe and conducive to learning.”); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v.
State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 667 (N.Y. 1995) (“We think it beyond cavil that the failure to
provide the opportunity to obtain such fundamental skills as literacy and the ability
to add, subtract and divide numbers would constitute a violation of the Education
Article.”).
123. See Molly A. Hunter & Kathleen J. Gebhardt, Legal Precedent and the
Opportunity for Educational Equity: Where to Now, Colorado?, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 893,
894 (2016) (“Though defendant states often prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s in
cases based on equal protection clauses and seeking equal per-pupil funding,
plaintiffs’ success rate improved as they focused more on ensuring that schools had
sufficient resources to educate all students, relying on state constitutional education
articles.”).
124. From Rose until the early 1990s, plaintiffs won six of nine cases (66%) that
reached a final state supreme court decision. Koski, supra note 6, at 1264. The
jurisprudential distinction between adequacy and finance may be less clear. See
Gormley, supra note 9, at 218 (“It is unhelpful and inaccurate to suggest that these
cases can be segregated and packaged into neat ‘equality’ and ‘adequacy’ boxes. In
fact, most state constitutional decisions in this area contain elements of both
equality and adequacy themes.”).
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achievement for students of color.125 First, school districts comprised
primarily of students of color have not fared as well as mostly white
districts in such litigation.126 They lost school finance cases more
often than predominantly white districts.127 And even when
segregated or diverse districts have won, they have faced far more
legislative resistance to reform than predominantly white districts.128
Second, students of color trapped in segregated schools do not
always show increased student achievement even if their schools
receive more money.129 Thus, while many segregated schools still
lack sufficient resources, segregation cannot be fixed by money
alone.130

125. See Michael Rebell et al., Many Schools are Still Inadequate, Now What?, EDUC.
NEXT (2009), http://educationnext.org/many-schools-are-still-inadequate-nowwhat/ (last visited April 15, 2018) (“[A]verage black and Hispanic students [are]
lagging three or four grade levels behind the average white student. . . . [B]lack
students . . . have regressed compared to their peers nationally.”).
126. James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV.
432, 433 (1999) (“[M]inority school districts—particularly urban minority
districts—do not fare as well as white districts in school finance litigation.”).
127. See id. at 433 (reviewing cases and concluding that “minority districts do
not win school finance cases nearly as often as white districts do. . . .”)
128. See id. (finding that “in the few states where minority districts have
successfully challenged school finance schemes, they have encountered legislative
recalcitrance that exceeds, in both intensity and duration, the legislative resistance
that successful white districts have faced”); see also Garda, supra note 65, at 56
(“[P]oor minority districts that most need additional funding are the least likely to
obtain it through finance litigation.”).
129. See Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic
Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1353 (2004). As Professor
Molly McUsic has found, “[i]n school district after school district, large funding
increases have proved inadequate to overcome the educational disadvantages faced
by poor, underachieving students.” Id. See Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance
“Reform” May Not be Good Policy, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423, 437–38 (1991) (discussing
studies which conclude that there is “no strong or systematic relationship between
school expenditures and student performance”).
130. See James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 256 (1999)
(“Although it is possible that school finance reform could have been a helpful
supplement to desegregation, it is a poor substitute. Despite the hopes of early
school finance advocates, we should not expect school finance reform to solve the
problems created by the failure to desegregate many urban schools.”).
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State Law Segregation Claims
1.

Sheff

Efforts to improve educational outcomes for students of color
through state courts took a step further with a case filed two months
before the Rose decision was handed down.131 In Sheff v. O’Neill,132
plaintiffs brought a hybrid case that combined previous adequacy
cases with federal desegregation theories.133 Like previous school
finance cases, Sheff relied on the state constitution (Connecticut)
and the case was filed in state court—but, instead of seeking more
equitable funding or more resources to improve education, Sheff
challenged the segregation of Hartford’s schools.134 In Sheff, the
plaintiffs alleged that “students in the Hartford public schools are
burdened by severe educational disadvantages arising out of their
racial and ethnic isolation and their socioeconomic deprivation.”135
Importantly, unlike federal courts, the court in Sheff did not
limit its inquiry to intentional conduct or school district

131. Rose was decided on June 8, 1989. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc.,
790 S.W.2d 186, 186 (Ky. 1989). Sheff was filed shortly before that on April 28, 1989.
Gayl Shaw Westerman, The Promise of State Constitutionalism: Can It Be Fulfilled in Sheff
v. O’Neill?, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 351, 353 (1996).
132. 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
133. See John C. Brittain, Why Sheff v. O’Neill Is a Landmark Decision, 30 CONN.
L. REV. 211, 213–14 (1997) (explaining how Sheff blended school finance equity
theory with a theory similar to traditional desegregation cases). Sheff also illustrates
how funding is not enough to address school segregation. 678 A.2d at 1281. Twelve
years before Sheff, the Connecticut Supreme Court struck down the state’s school
funding structure in a traditional school finance case. See Horton v. Meskill, 376
A.2d 359, 374–75 (Conn. 1977). As a result, Connecticut provided the most state aid
to the Hartford schools, which were predominantly low-income and students of
color. Liu, supra note 102, at 105. The effect was to make the inner city schools the
highest funded in the region. Id. The court had specifically found that “[s]tate
financial aid is distributed so that the neediest school districts receive the most aid.”
Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1273. Despite additional funding, however, students in Hartford’s
segregated schools did significantly worse than their suburban counterparts. See id.
(noting that academic performance of Hartford students fell “significantly below
that of schoolchildren from the twenty-one surrounding suburban towns”); see also
McUsic, supra note 129, at 1353 (“Despite the millions of dollars in state resources
spent on the Hartford, Connecticut schools, for example, students attending them
have scored far below statewide and suburban test-score averages in every area
tested, at every grade level in every year.”).
134. 678 A.2d at 1271.
135. Id.

2018]

JUSTICIABILITY OF SCHOOL SEGREGATION CLAIMS

423

boundaries.136 Rejecting the state’s argument that adequacy cases do
not extend to issues other than a school’s funding,137 the
Connecticut Supreme Court held that “the existence of extreme
racial and ethnic isolation in the public school system” violates the
state constitution.138 Like Rose before it, Sheff demonstrated that “the
underlying right recognized in school finance cases—the right to an
adequate or equal education—need not be defined solely in
monetary terms.”139 Under Sheff, educational adequacy required
eliminating school segregation.140

136. Id. Importantly, unlike the federal cases in the Brown progeny, the issue of
intent and the de jure / de facto distinction were not relevant. See id. at 1285 (“Racial
and ethnic segregation has a pervasive and invidious impact on schools, whether
the segregation results from intentional conduct or from unorchestrated
demographic factors.”). The court made clear the legislature must “remedy
segregation in our public schools, regardless of whether that segregation has
occurred de jure or de facto.” Id. at 1283.
137. Id. at 1281. For the court in Sheff, the central issue was “whether the state
has fully satisfied its affirmative constitutional obligation to provide a substantially
equal educational opportunity if the state demonstrates that it has substantially
equalized school funding and resources.” Id.
138. See id. (explaining that the requirement of educational adequacy under the
state constitution “differs in kind from most constitutional obligations” in that it
“explicitly require[s] the state to act rather than not to refrain from acting”).
According to Sheff, Connecticut has an affirmative obligation under the state
constitution to repair the racial isolation in Hartford’s public schools. See id. at
1270–71 (“We hold today that the needy schoolchildren of Hartford have waited
long enough. The constitutional imperatives . . . of our state constitution entitle the
plaintiffs to relief.”).
139. Ryan, supra note 105, at 532.
140. Unlike Rose, however, the court in Sheff failed to articulate any specific
criteria to guide the legislature. After ruling that de facto segregation violated the
state constitution, the court limited its relief to a declaratory judgment that the
school districting and boundary drawing system was unconstitutional. Sheff, 678 A.2d
at 1291. In “staying [its] hand,” the court issued only an admonishment to “the
legislature and the executive branch to put the search for appropriate remedial
measures at the top of their respective agendas.” Id. at 1290; see also James K.
Gooch, Fenced In: Why Sheff v. O’Neill Can’t Save Connecticut’s Inner City Students, 22
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 395, 415 (2004) (criticizing the remedy in Sheff because it “did
not offer detailed guidance as to what ‘appropriate measures’ might be, nor set a
timetable for achieving improvement. Perhaps more immediately harmful was its
failure to offer a standard by which improvement could be judged”).
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Minnesota Cases

Two Minnesota cases have followed Sheff’s lead, using state
constitutional principles to challenge school segregation.141 In
Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP v. Minnesota, filed shortly before the
Sheff decision and based on the Sheff complaint,142 plaintiffs argued
that racial and socioeconomic segregation in Minneapolis schools
violated the Minnesota Constitution’s education and equal
protection clauses.143 Two years prior, the Minnesota Supreme Court
had determined that the state’s education clause created a
fundamental right to education.144
The Minneapolis NAACP case withstood two separate motions to
dismiss and a certified question to the state supreme court.145 After

141. See Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017);
Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP. v. Minnesota, No. 95–14800 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Sept. 19, 1995) [hereinafter Minneapolis NAACP Complaint].
142. See Margaret C. Hobday et al., A Missed Opportunity: Minnesota’s Failed
Experiment with Choice-based Integration, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 936, 956 n.124
(2009) (“The litigation was, in large part, modeled after the ongoing litigation in
Connecticut, Sheff v. O’Neill.”); see also Myron Orfield, Choice, Equal Protection, and
Metropolitan Integration: the Hope of the Minneapolis Desegregation Settlement, 24 L. &
INEQ. 269, 311 (2006) (noting that Sheff was argued in the state supreme court just
nine days after the filing of the Minneapolis NAACP Complaint).
143. Minneapolis NAACP Complaint. The suit also brought claims of housing
segregation, which were dismissed because of potential interference with an existing
consent decree for desegregating public housing. NAACP, Minneapolis Branch v.
Metro. Council, 125 F.3d 1171 (8th Cir. 1997), vacated, 522 U.S. 1145 (1998), aff’d
on reh’g, 144 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir. 1998).
144. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993). In Skeen, the Minnesota
Supreme Court conducted a thorough analysis of the state constitution. See id. at
309–10. After analyzing the text of the constitution, the court reasoned: “[W]e hold
that education is a fundamental right under the state constitution, not only because
of its overall importance to the state but also because of the explicit language used
to describe this constitutional mandate. While a fundamental right cannot be found
“[a]bsent constitutional mandate,” the Education Clause is a mandate, not simply a
grant of power.” Id. at 313 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 31(1973)). See Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) (declaring
Connecticut’s constitution to contain a fundamental right to education).
145. Orfield, supra note 142, at 312–13 (“The district court judge, after hearing
arguments in April 1996, ordered several defendants dismissed but allowed the case
to go forward. The district court also determined that the issues raised in the case
were sufficiently novel and important enough to be decided directly by the
Minnesota Supreme Court. The higher court refused to hear the certified questions,
and the defendants subsequently sought unsuccessfully to have the case dismissed
on jurisdictional grounds.”).
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multiple attempts at mediation, the case finally settled in 2000,
nearly five years after being filed.146 Though small in scope and scale,
the settlement has largely been viewed as a success, albeit a limited
one.147 The settlement established a four-year experimental program
that provided students living in the most racially isolated
neighborhoods in Minneapolis with free transportation as well as
guaranteed seats in successful suburban schools and the highest
performing magnet schools in Minneapolis.148 The legislature voted
to continue the program after the four-year settlement expired,149
and a version of the program still exists today.150
In 2015, a second lawsuit was filed in Minnesota challenging
racial and socioeconomic segregation under the state
constitution.151 In Cruz-Guzman v. State of Minnesota, the plaintiffs
alleged again that segregated schools deny schoolchildren their
right to receive an adequate education under their state
constitution.152 The complaint and legal theories are nearly the same

146. See generally Settlement Agreement, Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP v.
State (undated) [hereinafter Minneapolis NAACP Settlement] at 1–7 (on file with
authors).
147. See Kahlenberg, supra note 62, at 1587 (“The program, though small, has
been seen as a success.”); Orfield, supra note 142, at 315–18 (detailing the positive
aspects of the settlement, including the growth of the program, the survey results of
participating parents, and the desegregating impact on suburban districts along
with poorly executed aspects, such as the “poor publicity” of different features and
underutilization by intended benefactors).
148. Minneapolis NAACP Settlement, supra note 146, at 2. At the end of the four
years, the plaintiffs were free to reinstitute their lawsuit if sufficient progress had
not been made. Id. at 3–4.
149. Kahlenberg, supra note 62, at 1587.
150. See Isaac Peterson, One Desegregation Lawsuit Not Enough, MINNESOTA
SPOKESMAN-RECORDER (June 28, 2015) (quoting Dan Shulman, lead attorney in the
Minneapolis NAACP case, stating “[t]o one degree or another [The Choice is Yours
Plan] still exists”).
151. Class Action Complaint, Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2017) (No. 27-CV-15-19117) [hereinafter “Cruz-Guzman Complaint”]. The
complaint specifically alleges that students in Minneapolis and St. Paul public
schools are segregated by race and class in violation of the Minnesota Constitution.
Id. ¶ 2; see also Quick Facts about the Cruz-Guzman v. State of Minnesota Educational
Adequacy Case, http://www.gpmlaw.com/portalresource/Cruz-Guzman_quickfacts.pdf [hereinafter “Quick Facts about Cruz-Guzman”]. The plaintiffs also include
One Family One Community, a Minnesota nonprofit organization. Cruz-Guzman
Complaint ¶ 14.
152. The complaint alleges that a segregated education is per se an inadequate
education under the Minnesota Constitution. Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra note
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as the Minneapolis NAACP case in the 1990s.153 In 2015, however, the
conditions in Minneapolis schools were arguably worse than the
conditions giving rise to the previous case.154 Segregation had
become more intense, with far more highly segregated schools than
in 1995.155 At the time of the Cruz-Guzman complaint, there were
thirty-six public schools in Minneapolis and St. Paul combined
containing 90% or more students of color.156 Segregation had also
spread into suburban districts, where at least thirty-four schools in
fourteen districts were less than one-third white.157 Students of color
had proficiency rates in reading, math, and science at less than onethird the proficiency rates of white students.158
On July 8, 2016, the district court denied the main parts of
defendants’ motion to dismiss.159 Importantly, the court
151, ¶ 69. The complaint also alleges that the State of Minnesota is strictly liable for
this deprivation of Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to an adequate education. Id. ¶ 74.
153. Plaintiffs’ counsel makes clear that Cruz-Guzman is basically the same case
as Minneapolis NAACP. See Peterson, supra note 150 (quoting the lead attorney,
“[e]ssentially, you could say it’s the son of the previous case; it’s the same case. Of
course, there will be different plaintiffs, but it will assert many of the same
violations.”). There is even a significant overlap in the roster of lawyers representing
the plaintiffs. See Quick Facts about Cruz-Guzman, supra note 151, at 1 (explaining
that the current lawyers comprise “three attorneys [who] represented the plaintiffs
in the [Minneapolis NAACP] educational adequacy litigation in the 1990s”). Unlike
Minneapolis NAACP, however, Cruz-Guzman has expanded its coverage to both
Minneapolis and St. Paul. See Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra note 151, ¶ 2 (“The
Minneapolis Public Schools have been in the past and currently are segregated on
the basis of both race and socioeconomic status, such that members of the plaintiff
class attend schools the enrollment of which is disproportionately comprised of
minority students and students living in poverty, as compared with neighboring and
surrounding suburban school districts.”).
154. See Peterson, supra note 150 (quoting the lead plaintiff’s attorney
explaining that “[t]he same conditions that existed when we filed the first case in
1995 have reoccurred almost 20 years later. And they’re worse”).
155. Id.
156. Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra note 151, ¶¶ 23, 25. Such a high number of
racially isolated schools is remarkable in a state that is less than 30% students of
color. Id. ¶ 21.
157. Id. ¶ 51.
158. Id. ¶ 36. Disparities in science proficiency were particularly stark. In
Minneapolis, the ratio of white student proficiency to African American student
proficiency in science was 71.1% to 12.5%. In St. Paul, the ratio is 64.2% to 14%. Id.
159. The court was relying on a previous Minnesota case that established
education as a fundamental right and “cited with approval” Rose and its progeny. See
Order Den. Mot. to Dismiss, Cruz-Guzman v. State of Minnesota, July 8, 2016, at 14
(“[T]he Skeen court cited with approval several cases from other states that
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acknowledged the link between Cruz-Guzman and the previous
adequacy cases that established that education clauses contain a
“qualitative standard.”160 On March 13, 2017, however, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision,
deeming the plaintiffs’ claims a nonjusticiable political question.161
On April 26, 2017, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the
dismissal order and granted review.162 Notably, amici curiae were filed
by eleven local and twenty-one national education and constitutional
scholars, unanimously arguing for overturning the Court of Appeals
decision.163
IV. BACKGROUND ON JUSTICIABILITY
The 2017 dismissal of Minnesota’s Cruz-Guzman case was not the
first time that state educational adequacy claims have found
themselves obstructed by justiciability principles.164 Several other
adequacy cases have been dismissed at least superficially on similar
grounds, leading to concern among some scholars that courts are
beginning to doubt their role as the guarantors of a constitutionally
sufficient education.165

recognized a qualitative educational standard within their respective constitutions.”
(citing Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 310–12 (Minn. 1993))) (on file with
authors).
160. Id.
161. See Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017), review
granted, Cruz-Guzman v. State, No. A16-1265, 2017 Minn. LEXIS 236 (Apr. 26, 2017)
(reversing the district court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss because CruzGuzman’s claims present a nonjusticiable political question).
162. Id.; Beena Raghavendran, Minnesota Supreme Court to Take Up School
Integration Lawsuit, STAR TRIB., Apr. 27, 2017, at B2.
163. See, e.g., Br. of Amici Curiae Educ. Law Ctr. and the Constitutional & Educ.
Law Scholars in Support of Pl.’s-Pet’rs [hereinafter ELC Brief] and Br. of Amici
Curiae Concerned Law Professors [hereinafter CLP Brief] (both filed June 2, 2017)
(briefs on file with authors). Both briefs assert that the Court of Appeals “deviated
from this significant body of case law” in a fashion that is “inconsistent with
principles of justiciability” as commonly applied across numerous adequacy cases
from across the country. ELC Brief, at 10–11; CLP Brief, at 15 n.5.
164. See Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 13, at 83 (describing how justiciability
and “separation of powers concerns have begun to drive state courts out of this
important avenue of education reform”).
165. Some state courts have ruled that educational adequacy cases are
nonjusticiable, particularly where judges are “concerned about their institutional
competence to deal with the questions presented.” Id. at 118.
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Basic Principles and Federal Law

Political question justiciability is a concept that is sometimes
easier to grasp in the abstract than in application. The United States
Supreme Court has stated, “[t]he nonjusticiability of a political
question is primarily a function of the separation of powers,”
implying that the doctrine arises from the intent of the U.S.
Constitution to adjudicate certain matters through the operation of
the political system rather than through litigation in the courts.166
The reality of the doctrine is less straightforward, and appears to
raise questions of the courts’ expertise as well as their intended role
in the constitutional scheme.167
The most elaborate clarification of political question
justiciability arose in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Baker v. Carr,168
which created a six-part test to evaluate whether a case involves a
political question. In order to be deemed nonjusticiable, a case must
involve one of the following:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or
[2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or
[3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or
[4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or
[5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or
[6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one
question.169
The Court set a high bar for nonjusticiability, clarifying that
“[u]nless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at

166. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
167. See Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 13, at 97 (noting the challenges of the
justiciability doctrine by analyzing judicial competence).
168. 369 U.S. 186.
169. Id. at 217. A number of adequacy cases have applied the Baker test. See infra
notes 191–195 and accompanying text (explaining how the majority of adequacy
cases have found claims justiciable).
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bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground
of a political question’s presence.”170 Courts may not reject “bona
fide” lawsuits just because there is a question “as to whether some
action denominated ‘political’ exceeds constitutional authority.”171
The Supreme Court has long held that courts have the authority
to interpret what the law means and review whether government
actors have complied with the law, particularly when protecting
constitutional rights.172 For the Court, “injury to a legally protected
right” is the “touchstone to justiciability.”173 In fact, access to the
courts to preserve rights and remedy violations has been a
foundation of our legal system dating back to English common
law.174
The federal political question doctrine, as a limitation on these
principles, has been subject to debate and criticism by leading
scholars.175 A major critique of the political question doctrine is that
170. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (emphasis added).
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“[W]here
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever
that right is invaded.”). The Supreme Court has recognized, since its beginning,
that courts not only have the power to decide whether a constitutional right has
been violated but that it is “the very essence of judicial duty” to do so. Id. at
178–79; Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU No. 12 v. State, 907 A.2d 988, 996 (N.H. 2006)
(“[T]he judiciary has a responsibility to ensure that constitutional rights not be
hollowed out and, in the absence of action by other branches, a judicial remedy is
not only appropriate but essential.”).
173. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 140 (1950)
(plurality opinion).
174. As far back as the seventeenth century, English law recognized the right of
individuals who had no personal stake in the outcome to obtain a writ of
prohibition. Couey v. Atkins, 355 P.3d 866, 878, 902 (Or. 2015) (citing EDWARD
COKE, 2 INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 602 (1797)). In a similar vein, the court
in Couey also cited Blackstone, who noted the existence of “popular actions,” which
could be brought by any person. Id. at 887 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 161 (1803)). As for early American courts,
the court recalled that nineteenth-century caselaw widely recognized that
individuals with no particular personal interest could bring actions to vindicate
public rights. Id. at 888.
175. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 99 (1987)
(arguing that the political question doctrine is “inconsistent with the most
fundamental purpose of the Constitution: safeguarding matters from majority
rule”); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the ‘Political Question,’ 79 NW. U. L. REV.
1031, 1059–60 (1984) (criticizing the political question doctrine because it allows
other branches of the federal government to violate constitutional provisions
without the check of judicial review).
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the Baker criteria “seem useless in identifying what constitutes a
political question.”176 Notwithstanding ample litigation, the United
States Supreme Court has rarely found that a political question bars
its adjudication of an issue.177 As one state supreme court observed,
the Supreme Court did not even discuss the doctrine in Bush v. Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board178 or Bush v. Gore,179 which involved
the 2000 national presidential election and certainly raised “a
‘political issue’ as conventionally understood. . . .”180
B.

Justiciability in State Courts

State courts, of course, are free to establish their own rules of
justiciability.181 The United States Supreme Court has been clear that
federal justiciability rules bind only federal courts, leaving state
courts to develop their own justiciability doctrines.182 State courts
must consider their own “special needs of state and local
governance” in configuring their state justiciability doctrine, rather
176. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 153 (6th ed. 2012).
177. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 267–68
(2002) (“In fact, in the almost forty years since Baker v. Carr was decided, a majority
of the Court has found only two issues to present political questions, and both
involved strong textual anchors for finding that the constitutional decision rested
with the political branches.”).
178. 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
179. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
180. Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 780
(Tex. 2005). As the court observed, the U.S. Supreme Court “has held only two
issues to be nonjusticiable political questions. . . . [The Court] did not hold the oneman-one-vote congressional apportionment issue in Baker v. Carr to be a political
question, and it has refused to hold issues to be political questions in at least seven
other cases.” Id. at 779.
181. Brennan, supra note 112, at 493. Justice Brennan, who authored Baker,
declared that “state courts that rest their decisions wholly or even partly on state law
need not apply federal principles of standing and justiciability that deny litigants
access to the courts.” Id. at 501.
182. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“[T]he constraints
of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not
bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of
justiciability.”); N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 8 n.2
(1988) (“[T]he special limitations that Article III of the Constitution imposes on
the jurisdiction of the federal courts are not binding on the state courts. The States
are thus left free . . . to determine matters that would not satisfy the more stringent
requirement in the federal courts that an actual ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ be presented
for resolution.” (citation omitted)).
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than confining their assessments to federal constraints.183 The
federal political question doctrine has limited value for state courts,
where “there are hardly any state analogues to the self-imposed
constraints on justiciability, ‘political questions,’ and the like.”184
There are significant differences between the separation of powers
under state constitutions compared to those under the U.S.
Constitution.185
One important distinction between state and federal
constitutions is the inherent remedial role of state courts. This is due
to the different nature of the rights accorded in state constitutions
and the United States Constitution.186 The United States
183. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1905 (2001). As Professor Hershkoff has stated,
state constitutions “do not reflect the same level of trust in state legislative decisionmaking as does the [F]ederal Constitution in congressional decision-making.” Id. at
1891–92. “Article I of the Constitution assumes that Congress is best situated to
decide how to carry out the terms of its authority. . . . State constitutions, in contrast,
impose not only substantive, but also procedural requirements on legislative
activity.” Id. at 1892. “[S]uch provisions alter the dynamics of lawmaking,
implicating the state courts in the resolution of certain governance questions that
are largely outside the Article III experience.” Id. at 1893. In some states, the courts
have not applied any limitations under the political question doctrine. See, e.g.,
Backman v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 441 N.E.2d 523, 527 (Mass. 1982) (“[W]e
have never explicitly incorporated the [political question] doctrine into our State
jurisprudence, [because] . . . this court has an obligation to adjudicate claims that
particular actions conflict with constitutional requirements.”).
184. Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 248
(1972).
185. See Christine M. Durham, The Judicial Branch in State Government: Parables of
Law, Politics, and Power, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1601, 1603 (2001) (“State constitutions
have a tradition independent of federal law in the allocation of power among the
branches of state government and in their development and understanding of
republican principles.”); Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm:
Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1543, 1558 (1997) (“State courts
regularly are called upon to enforce state constitutional obligations that, for sound
reasons of federalism, federal courts have declined to enforce.”). As the Supreme
Court explained long ago, “[w]hether the legislative, executive, and judicial powers
of a state shall be kept altogether distinct and separate, or whether persons or
collections of persons belonging to one department may, in respect to some
matters, exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to another department of
government, is for the determination of the state.” Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84
(1902).
186. See Gary S. Gildin, Redressing Deprivations of Rights Secured by State
Constitutions Outside the Shadow of the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Remedies
Jurisprudence, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 877, 881–83 (2011) (“Just as state courts may
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Constitution mostly grants “negative” rights—those rights upon
which the government may not infringe.187 If a court finds an
infringement of a negative right, the remedy is most likely limited to
stopping the infringement by prohibiting and perhaps even
punishing the action.188 The difference in the inherent remedial
power of state courts arises because all state constitutions also grant
“positive” rights, including rights that entitle individuals to benefits
or actions by the state.189 In contrast to protecting “negative” rights,
preventing government action represents the greatest threat to
“positive” rights.190
C.

Application to Educational Adequacy Lawsuits

As discussed above, several educational adequacy claims have
been defeated on justiciability grounds.191 However, a simple tally
shows that these decisions do not, at least not so far, represent a sea
change in state education law. The “clear majority” of state courts,
when addressing adequacy claims, have ruled in favor of

legitimately find rights to be guaranteed by state constitutions where the United
States Supreme Court has refused to protect the right under the
federal Constitution, state courts are free to adopt a remedial scheme that more
generously compensates the rights-holder. . . .”).
187. See Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial Power
in the Kansas School Finance Litigation, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1024–34 (2006) (“Most
constitutional rights are ‘negative’ rights in the sense that they prohibit the
government from taking action that interferes with a right that the individual
already has.”).
188. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980) (“Although the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted
government interference with freedom of choice in the context of certain personal
decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to
realize all the advantages of that freedom.”).
189. See Hershkoff, supra note 183, at 1889–90 (“Such provisions shift the
inertial bias associated with the federal government: if negative rights under the
[F]ederal Constitution restrain government action, positive rights under state
constitutions mandate such action.”).
190. See Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive
Rights Claims: The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERS L.J.
1057, 1089 (1993) (“[W]hen positive rights are at issue legislative action represents
the good and legislative inertia the evil.”). Indeed, “legislative action satisfying a
constitutional obligation is extremely unlikely unless judicial rulings call for such
action.” Id.
191. See supra Part III.B; see also Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 13, at 95–98
(discussing education litigation and justiciability).
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justiciability.192 Dozens of state high courts have affirmed their
judiciary’s role in vindicating constitutional education guarantees to
children.193 In most adequacy cases when defendants raise
justiciability arguments, “the courts reject them out of hand.”194
According to one recent study, out of twenty-nine different state
educational adequacy cases since 1989, only “seven states . . . have
held for defendants at the basic liability stage in sound basic
education.”195 Before 1989, every court to which defendants
presented this “political question” argument patently rejected it.196
Courts have found justiciability particularly appropriate given
the constitutional nature of education adequacy claims.197 In
adequacy claims, courts have the “final obligation to guard, enforce,
and protect” their states’ constitutional education requirements.198
192. Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1219 (Kan. 2014) (“[A] clear majority of
[state courts] have ruled in favor of justiciability. . . .”).
193. See ELC BRIEF, supra note 163, at 8 (collecting cases where state high courts
have held that lawsuits challenging whether education has been provided in
accordance with a constitutionally enshrined standard are justiciable).
194. REBELL, supra note 1, at 23.
195. Id. at 22–23.
196. Allen W. Hubsch, Education and Self-Government: The Right to Education Under
State Constitutional Law, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 93, 115–16 (1989); see also McDaniel v.
Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 157 (Ga. 1981) (“Indeed, ‘[w]e know of no sister State
which has refused merits treatment to such issues, and we would regard our own
refusal to adjudicate plaintiffs’ claim of constitutional infringement an abdication
of our constitutional duties.’” (quoting Bd. of Educ., Levittown v. Nyquist, 443
N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981))); see also Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585
P.2d 71, 87 (Wash. 1978) (concluding that “the judiciary has the ultimate power
and the duty to interpret, construe and give meaning to words, sections and articles
of the constitution” because “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is”).
197. The Kentucky Supreme Court summarized this widely adopted rule aptly:
“Courts may, should, and have involved themselves in defining the standards of a
constitutionally mandated educational system.” Rose v. Council for Better Educ.,
Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 210 (Ky. 1989).
198. Columbia Falls Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 261 (Mont.
2005) (“As the final guardian and protector of the right to education, it is
incumbent upon the court to assure that the system enacted by the Legislature
enforces, protects and fulfills the right.”). See Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 371–72
(Colo. 2009) (holding “the court has the responsibility to review whether the actions
of the legislature are consistent with its obligation to provide a thorough and
uniform public school system”); Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans,
850 P.2d 724, 734 (Idaho 1993) (declining “to accept the respondents’ argument
that the other branches of government be allowed to interpret the constitution for
us”).
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To find otherwise “would be a complete abrogation of judicial
responsibility” and would do a “severe disservice to the people.”199
Courts carrying out this judicial responsibility is the only way to
ensure that “the Legislature . . . fulfill[s] [its] constitutional
mandate” to provide a sound education.200
As the court in Rose explained:
The judiciary has the ultimate power, and the duty, to
apply, interpret, define, construe all words, phrases,
sentences and sections of the Kentucky Constitution as
necessitated by the controversies before it. It is solely the
function of the judiciary to so do. This duty must be
exercised even when such action serves as a check on the
activities of another branch of government or when the
court’s view of the constitution is contrary to that of other
branches, or even that of the public.201
Under the basic principle of the separation of powers for the
Kentucky Supreme Court, “[t]o allow the General Assembly . . . to
decide whether its [own] actions are constitutional is literally
unthinkable.”202 When the “question becomes whether the
legislature has actually performed its duty” under an education
clause, it “is left to the courts to answer.”203 It is exclusively the courts’
responsibility to do so.204
D.

When Have Adequacy Claims Been Found Nonjusticiable?

While the majority of state courts have firmly rejected the idea
that educational adequacy lawsuits are nonjusticiable,205 it is also
worthwhile to explore cases found nonjusticiable. Doing so reveals
that these decisions are not merely an instance of courts diverging
on identical questions. Instead, in many cases, important substantive

199. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 484 (Ark. 2002).
200. Hussein v. State, 973 N.E.2d 752, 754 (N.Y. 2012).
201. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 209 (Ky. 1989).
202. Id.
203. Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1226 (Kan. 2014).
204. See DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997) (“We will not dodge our
responsibility by asserting that this case involves a nonjusticiable political question.
To do so is unthinkable.”).
205. Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1219 (Kan. 2014) (noting that a “clear
majority” of other state courts have ruled in favor of justiciability).

2018]

JUSTICIABILITY OF SCHOOL SEGREGATION CLAIMS

435

differences in law, legislative history, or constitutional language can
account for seemingly divergent outcomes between states.206
Each of the clear minority of cases that have held adequacy
claims nonjusticiable occurred in a state that has not deemed
education a fundamental right.207 As discussed below, of those seven
cases, only five states rely on justiciability in their dismissals, and only
four rely upon the Baker v. Carr political question doctrine.208 By
contrast, twenty-two state supreme courts have held that their
respective education clauses produce justiciable claims.209
1.

Nebraska

In 2007, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed that school
funding claims based on the state education clause were
nonjusticiable.210 The court had not yet addressed whether the state
education clause created a fundamental right to education.211
Moreover, the language of the education clause is from the
“establishment only” end of the spectrum and particularly weak.212
The clause only states that “it shall be the duty of the Legislature to
pass suitable laws . . . to encourage schools and the means of
instruction.”213 But perhaps most importantly, the court determined
that the history of the state constitution strongly supported
legislative control of school funding and counseled against the
recognition of a fundamental right to education.214 Not only had a
1972 revision to the state constitution eliminated a provision
requiring an equitable distribution of funds, but in 1996, voters
206. See supra Part III.C (discussing cases which have held that educational
adequacy lawsuits are nonjusticiable).
207. See supra note 40 (listing states in which education is deemed a fundamental
right). There is now one notable exception: the Minnesota Court of Appeals
decision in Cruz-Guzman.
208. See infra Part III Sections D.1–D.6. The seventh case is the Minnesota Court
of Appeals decision in Cruz-Guzman. 892 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017).
209. CLP Brief, supra note 163, at 11.
210. Neb. Coal. For Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164
(Neb. 2007).
211. But cf. Citizens of Decatur for Equal Educ. v. Lyons-Decatur-Lyons Sch.
Dist., 739 N.W.2d 742 (Neb. 2007) (holding that the Free Instruction Clause of
Nebraska’s state Constitution does not provide a fundamental right to equal and
adequate funding of schools).
212. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d at 170.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 179–80.
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rejected a proposed constitutional amendment that would explicitly
have made education a fundamental right.215
2.

Oklahoma

In 2007, the Oklahoma Supreme Court also held that a series of
school funding claims posed nonjusticiable political questions.216
Here, too, the court was asked to rule on significantly weaker
constitutional provisions.217 The Oklahoma Constitution provides
that: “[p]rovisions shall be made for the establishment and
maintenance of a system of public schools, which shall be open to all
the children of the state and free from sectarian control. . . .”218 As
in Nebraska, there had been no previous recognition of a
fundamental right to education.219 Instead, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court had previously held “the Legislature has few constitutional
restraints in carrying out its duty to establish and maintain a free
educational public system.”220
3.

Pennsylvania

In 1999, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided the narrow
question of whether claims against the state school funding system
were improperly dismissed as political questions.221 The
Pennsylvania judiciary had already held that the state’s education
clause created no fundamental right, or individual right, of any
kind.222 The court held that a constitutional provision requiring the
legislature to “provide for the maintenance of a thorough and
efficient system of public schools” was nonjusticiable.223 While its
constitutional language is considered in the middle range
category,224 the Minnesota Supreme Court felt that Pennsylvania’s

215. Id. at 180–81.
216. Okla. Educ. Ass’n v. State, 158 P.3d 1058 (Okla. 2007).
217. Id.
218. OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 5.
219. Okla. Educ. Ass’n, 158 P.3d at 1065–66.
220. Id.
221. Marrero ex rel. Tabalas v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110, 113 (Pa. 1999).
222. Id. at 112.
223. Id. at 112–13.
224. See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text (explaining how education
provisions in state constitutions are categorized).
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language was weaker than the “general and uniform” language
found in the Minnesota Education Clause.225
4.

Indiana

In Bonner v. Daniels, the plaintiffs challenged the state’s school
finance system by seeking “a declaratory judgment to establish that
the Indiana Constitution imposes an enforceable duty on the state
government to provide a standard of quality education to public
school students.”226 While these claims were dismissed, the court did
not rely on justiciability grounds.227 Instead, the court analyzed the
history and language of the state education clause, and determined
it was not intended to impose affirmative duties on the legislature.228
The Bonner plaintiffs also sought declaratory relief, arguing
education was a fundamental right.229 After brief analysis, the court
held their claim lacked merit because the Indiana Constitution did
not expressly grant a “right or entitlement to education.”230

225. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 315 (Minn. 1993) (“Thus, a clear
reading of the original constitution indicates that the drafters intended to draw a
distinction between the fundamental right to a ‘general and uniform system of
education’ and the financing of the education system, which merely must be
‘thorough and efficient.’”).
226. Bonner ex rel. Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 518 (Ind. 2009)
(claiming additionally that the state government did not meet its duty to provide a
standard of quality education).
227. Id. at 525 (Rucker, J., dissenting) (explaining the plaintiffs simply seek a
declaration that the education they receive falls short of the constitutional mandate
of providing a uniform system of open schools and stating “to say in effect that
plaintiffs have not presented a justiciable issue is simply wrong in my view”).
228. Id. at 521 (“As can be seen from the text of the Education Clause, its
language speaks only of a general duty to provide for a system of common schools
and does not require the attainment of any standard of resulting educational
quality.”); see King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 21 (Iowa 2012) (holding that Iowa’s
education clause does not mandate free public schools, or require the public
education system of Iowa to be “adequate, efficient, quality, thorough, or uniform”).
229. 907 N.E.2d at 519.
230. Id. at 522 (“[T]he drafters of our Constitution did not include any
reference to education in Article 1 of the Bill of Rights, which declares the rights of
individuals in relation to government. Education is not among the enumerated
individual rights.”).
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Iowa

A recent Iowa Supreme Court decision affirmed the dismissal of
a constitutional challenge to schools.231 The case, however, leaves
open the possibility that future constitutional challenges to public
education programs are justiciable.232 The plaintiffs brought suit
seeking a declaration that education is a fundamental right.233 The
plaintiffs also alleged the Iowa state government violated the state
education clause by failing to establish or enforce standards, failing
to adopt effective educator pay systems, and failing to “establish and
maintain an adequate education delivery system.”234 In doing so,
they relied upon the opening clause of the “perpetual support fund”
provision of the Iowa Constitution.235 The clause only indirectly
invoked school characteristics by stating “[t]he general assembly
shall encourage, by all suitable means, the promotion of intellectual,
scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.”236
The district court dismissed these claims as involving a
nonjusticiable political question.237 On appeal, however, the
supreme court expressly avoided deciding both the question of
justiciability and whether education constituted a fundamental
right—although it did reaffirm that “students have a due process
right to an adequate education. . . .”238 The court nonetheless
affirmed dismissal, holding the plaintiffs’ “specific challenges to the
educational policies of this state” were inadequate.239 But, crucially,
the court noted that its decision “does not foreclose future
constitutional challenges . . . in the vital field of public education.”240
6.

Illinois

The Illinois Education Clause states “[t]he State shall provide
for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions

231. King, 818 N.W.2d at 4.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 5–6.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 12.
236. IOWA CONST. art. IX, pt. 2, § 3.
237. King, 818 N.W.2d at 5, 10.
238. Id. at 22, 25–27.
239. Id. at 5 (explaining challenges to the state’s educational policies should be
brought to the plaintiffs’ elected representatives, rather than the court).
240. Id.

2018]

JUSTICIABILITY OF SCHOOL SEGREGATION CLAIMS

439

and services.”241 This was used as the basis for two school funding
claims in 1996: one premised on a failure to satisfy the legislative
duty created by the clause, and another founded on an equal
protection claim that the funding system impinged upon a
fundamental right.242 The Illinois court first held that claims under
the state education clause were political questions “outside the
sphere of judicial function.”243 But the court did not resolve the
equal protection component using the political question doctrine.244
Instead, the court determined that there was no fundamental right
to education in Illinois and thus the equal protection claims should
be resolved with a “rational basis review.”245 A second decision in
1999 reaffirmed these holdings.246
V. ARE STATE LAW SEGREGATION CLAIMS JUSTICIABLE?
Typically, when questions of justiciability are raised, educational
adequacy claims are evaluated generically. That is to say, courts have
decided the question without considering the underlying allegation
of harm.
Likewise, in the one instance of a Minnesota state law
segregation claim being dismissed on justiciability grounds—the
appellate ruling on the Minnesota Cruz-Guzman case—the claim was
evaluated generically, by applying the Baker v. Carr factors.247 The
plaintiffs in that case were described as seeking “an education of a

241. ILL. CONST. art. X § 1.
242. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1193, 1208 (Ill. 1996).
243. Id. at 1193.
244. Id. at 1203.
245. Id. at 1195.
246. Lewis v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 804–05 (Ill. 1999) (affirming dismissal
of an education clause claim when recognition of such a claim “would require the
judiciary to ascertain from the constitution alone the content of an ‘adequate’
education”). When confronted with nearly identical questions in Skeen, the
Minnesota Supreme Court took the opposite course. Rather than dismissing
education clause claims as nonjusticiable, the court determined that the language
of the clause created a substantive adequacy requirement, but not a blanket
uniformity requirement. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn. 1993).
When asked to recognize a fundamental right to education for the purposes of
equal protection claims, the court unambiguously did so, though it did not apply
that right to the facts before it. Id. at 315.
247. Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017).
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certain quality.”248 Indeed, beyond a single footnote, neither race
nor segregation was mentioned once in the court’s analysis.249
The weight of the evidence suggests that, using the Baker v. Carr
factors, adequacy suits should be justiciable regardless of their
factual claims.250 However, there is no reason a court’s inquiry into
the justiciability of an education clause claim must be neutral to the
underlying harms or allegations.251 It is plausible that certain types
of adequacy claims could be more justiciable than others—that is,
that some kinds of harms are especially appropriate for judicial
resolution.252
Segregation claims are likely to be one such category. In the case
of segregation claims, the robust body of preexisting law, the
practical experience of courts in resolving similar claims, and the
invocation of profoundly important and clearly defined
constitutional rights all counsel in favor of justiciability.253
A.

Applying Baker v. Carr to State Law Segregation Claims

The United States Supreme Court has assessed that the Baker
factors “are probably listed in descending order of both importance
and certainty.”254 When courts apply the Baker test in educational
adequacy cases, the most frequently relevant factors are the first
three: (1) “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
248. See id. at 535.
249. Id.
250. See Aaron Y. Tang, Broken Systems, Broken Duties: A New Theory for School
Finance Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1208 (2011) (“The vast majority of courts
have rejected state defendants’ non-justiciability arguments, reasoning that to
decline to address plaintiffs’ challenges would amount to an abdication of the
court’s essential responsibility to interpret the meaning of the state constitution.”);
see also Christine M. O’Neill, Closing the Door on Positive Rights: State Court Use of the
Political Question Doctrine to Deny Access to Educational Adequacy Claims, 42 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 545, 585 (2009) ( “[S]tate courts must stop using the federal political
question doctrine to abdicate their responsibility to children”).
251. Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of
Educational Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV.
701, 707 (2010).
252. See Jared S. Buszin, Beyond School Finance: Refocusing Education Reform
Litigation to Realize the Deferred Dream of Education Equality and Adequacy, 62 EMORY L.J.
1613, 1616 (2013).
253. Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (“A
segregation claim based on racial discrimination is justiciable.”). See Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
254. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004).
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the issue to a coordinate political department,” (2) a lack of
“judicially discoverable and manageable standards” for resolving the
claims, and (3) the need for the court to make “an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”255
1. Baker Factor #1 – Textually Demonstrable Commitment
One primary argument in adequacy cases that present courts
with nonjusticiable political questions is that “constitutional
language apparently favoring exclusive legislative responsibility for
education” amounts to a “textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment” to the legislature.256 In other words, because most
education clauses in state constitutions speak only to the legislature’s
duty to “provide” for the education of the state’s schoolchildren,
while omitting any mention of judicial review of the constitutionality
of the legislature’s chosen method of providing for education, there
must be no such authority vested in the judiciary.257 When examined
more closely, it becomes clear that this argument “represents a
fundamentally flawed view of the concept of judicial review.”258
Scholars have wondered if asking courts to set aside their
authority because of a “textually demonstrable commitment of the
issue”259 to another branch of government makes little sense in light
of the federal Constitution. As Professor Chemerinsky has pointed
out, “there is no place in the [federal] Constitution, where the text
states that the legislature or executive should decide whether a
particular action constitutes a constitutional violation.”260 Professor
Redish has similarly observed that because there is no clear judicial
review authority in the federal constitution, “the fact that a provision
vesting power refers to the political branches and not to the judiciary
cannot justify a finding of a textual commitment of discretion to the
political branches, because the same could be said of virtually every
provision vesting authority in a political branch.”261
255. See, e.g., Cruz-Guzman, 849 N.W.2d at 539–41 (applying the three factors of
the Baker test); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
256. Hubsch, supra note 196, at 115.
257. See id. at 134.
258. Redish, supra note 175, at 1033.
259. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
260. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 176, at 150 (“The Constitution does not mention
judicial review, much less limit it by creating ‘textually demonstrable commitments’
to other branches of government.”).
261. Redish, supra note 175, at 1040. “It is difficult to construe a constitutional
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State courts, in adequacy cases, have been similarly dismissive of
this factor, even where the state constitution clearly assigns the duty
to the legislature.262 In Neeley, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the
state’s argument that such a textual assignment satisfied Baker, and
explained that “by assigning to the Legislature a duty, [the
constitution] both empowers and obligates.”263 Even though the
constitution clearly commits to the legislature the authority to make
education policy, “the Constitution nowhere suggests that the
Legislature is to be the final authority on whether it has discharged
its constitutional obligation.”264
As the Texas court explained, “[i]f the framers had intended
the Legislature’s discretion to be absolute, they need not have
mandated that the public education system be efficient and suitable;
they could instead have provided only that the Legislature provide
whatever public education it deemed appropriate.”265 Importantly,
the court clarified that the courts are not excluded merely by the
mention of legislative prerogative, declaring that “[t]he
constitutional commitment of public education issues to the
Legislature is primary but not absolute.”266 Indeed, to leave a state’s
entire system of education to the legislature without any oversight
“would be a dangerous doctrine to announce.”267

provision as excluding judicial review on the basis of the facts that (1) the courts are
not mentioned, and (2) other branches are mentioned . . . because the power of
the judiciary to engage in judicial review is not explicitly mentioned in any
constitutional provision.” Id. at 1042.
262. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Political Question
Doctrine by State Courts, 9 A.L.R. 6th 177 (2005) (juxtaposing those states that have
held the right to education—and its funding—to be a political question against
those states that have not).
263. Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 778
(Tex. 2005) (citing TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. The Texas Supreme Court’s ruling was clear: “The final authority to
determine adherence to the Constitution resides with the Judiciary. . . .” Id. at 777
(quoting W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558, 563
(Tex. 2003)). Other courts have made this same point. See, e.g., Harris v. Shanahan,
387 P.2d 771, 777 (Kan. 1963) (“In the final analysis, this court is the sole arbiter of
the question whether an act of the legislature is invalid under the Constitution of
Kansas.”).
267. Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1220 (Kan. 2014) (quoting Comm’rs of
Sedgwick Co. v. Bailey, 13 Kan. 600, 607 (Kan. 1874)).
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But if carving out certain policy spheres as unreviewable is
dangerous, the danger is dramatically higher when the issue being
“textually committed” is the racial makeup of schools.268 Brown
establishes that the U.S. Constitution forbids the operation of
educational facilities intentionally segregated by race.269 State
constitutions cannot grant state agencies discretion to reach beyond
the bounds of federal constitutionality,270 and, in the case of
segregation, those bounds are clearly drawn.271 To find otherwise
would permit a state, at least in some circumstances, to attempt to
limit the reach of Brown by declaring school segregation a policy
issue for its legislature.272 At the very least, it may render certain
issues nonjusticiable political questions in state courts but justiciable
in federal courts.273 It is unlikely that a state constitution envisions
such a broad or arbitrary grant of legislative authority; the federal
Constitution does not.274 It is also unclear how much policy
discretion over the degree of school segregation a “coordinate
political department” could allowably be granted.275 Any intentional
effort to implement a school system with a greater degree of racial

268. See generally Michael Besso, Sheff v. O’Neill: The Connecticut Supreme Court at
the Bar of Politics, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 165, 183–97 (discussing the political climate
in Connecticut, prior to Sheff, that prevented real legislative change on the topic of
school racial integration).
268. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
269. Id.
270. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 400 (1819) (“The [United States
C]onstitution . . . shall be the supreme law of the land, and shall control all State
legislation and State constitutions, which may be incompatible therewith. . . .”).
271. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (“We conclude that in the field of public education
the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal.”).
272. Erika K. Wilson, Blurred Lines: Public School Reforms and the Privatization of
Public Education, 51 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 189, 191–92 (2016) (“However,
since at least the 1990s—and some may argue even earlier—federal courts have
become increasingly hostile to court mandated desegregation schemes.”).
273. See Franklin Sacha, Excising Federalism: The Consequences of Baker v. Carr
Beyond the Electoral Arena, 101 VA. L. REV. 2263, 2294 (2015) (“[T]he court stated that
the post-Baker political question doctrine did not implicate federalism, as it is ‘based
on concepts that underlie the separation of powers among the three branches of
the federal government rather than notions of federalism between the federal
government and the states’. . . .” (quoting DeJulio v. Georgia, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1274,
1291 (N.D. Ga. 2001))).
274. Id.
275. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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segregation seems likely to run up against constitutional
safeguards.276
2. Baker Factor #2 – Lack of Standards
Another central argument is that adequacy cases presents courts
with nonjusticiable political questions because the courts in such
cases cannot identify any “judicially discoverable and manageable
standards” for resolving claims of educational inadequacy.277 Under
this argument, courts are unable to evaluate “inadequate-education
claims” because they “inevitably require [courts] to define the
relevant qualitative standard.”278 Professor Redish argues that this
“so-called ‘absence-of-standards’ rationale borders on the
disingenuous, because the Supreme Court has never been at a loss
to decipher roughly workable standards for the vaguest of
constitutional provisions when it so desires.”279 For example, courts
have had to determine standards for plenty of vague terminology,
including what constitutes sufficient “probable cause,”280 whether a
276. Policy decisions made with the intent of moving the racial balance of
schools in a segregative direction likely pose an equal protection problem, as they
would represent disparate treatment of a group on the basis of membership in a
protected class. See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 471–72 (1989)
(applying strict scrutiny to all race-based classifications in Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection claims). By contrast, policy decisions made with the intent of
moving the racial balance in schools in an integrative direction may be permissible,
because there is a compelling government interest in school diversity. Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787–88 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
277. Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533, 539 (citation omitted). See Redish,
supra note 175, at 1046 (“Perhaps the most widely cited ground in support of the
prudential [version of the political question] doctrine is the view that certain
constitutional provisions do not lend themselves to the development of workable
generalizable standards of construction. . . .”).
278. Cruz-Guzman, 892 N.W.2d at 540.
279. Redish, supra note 175, at 1060; Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1228 (Kan.
2014) (“We also observe that courts are frequently called upon, and adept at,
defining and applying various, perhaps imprecise, constitutional standards.”);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1275 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s determination
of what constitutes a judicially manageable standard is “so discretionary . . . that if
the requirement of judicial manageability [was] applied to the Court’s own decision
making process . . . the criteria by which the Court identifies judicially
unmanageable standards might themselves be disqualified as judicially
unmanageable”).
280. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975).
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specific punishment is “cruel and unusual,”281 and what represents
“equal protection under the laws.”282 As Professor Redish points out,
“Courts are often called upon to apply generalized and ambiguous
abstract principles to specific factual situations, even when the
application of those principles is unclear.”283 As one state supreme
court summed up, “[t]he judiciary is well-accustomed to applying
substantive standards the crux of which is reasonableness.”284 In
comparison, disagreements about the meaning of the state
constitutional language “are not unique to the [state’s education
clause]; they persist as to the meanings and applications of due
course of law, equal protection, and many other constitutional
provisions. Indeed, those provisions have inspired far more litigation
than [the state’s education clause].”285
As one example from the adequacy context, the Connecticut
Supreme Court found enforceable standards in its state
constitution’s education clause, which merely provided that “[t]here
shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the
state” and that “[t]he general assembly shall implement this
principle by appropriate legislation.”286 The court acknowledged this
language was less specific than that found in some other state
constitutions’ education clauses,287 but nevertheless held that such
language:
embodies a substantive component requiring that the
public schools provide their students with an education
suitable to give them the opportunity to be responsible
citizens able to participate fully in democratic institutions,
such as jury service and voting, and to prepare them to
progress to institutions of higher education, or to attain
productive employment and otherwise to contribute to the
state’s economy.288
281. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 243–47 (1972).
282. Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948). See Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S.
214 (1944) (discussing how legal restrictions targeted at a specific racial group are
subject to the highest scrutiny under Equal Protection principles).
283. Redish, supra note 175, at 1050.
284. Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist, 176 S.W.3d 746, 778
(Tex. 2005).
285. Id. at 779.
286. Conn. Coal. for Just. in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 228
(Conn. 2010) (quoting CONN. CONST. art. 8, § 1).
287. Id. at 223.
288. Id. at 227.
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The court explained that “[t]o satisfy this standard, the state,
through the local school districts, must provide students with an
objectively ‘meaningful opportunity’ to receive the benefits of this
constitutional right.”289
Even though constitutional standards in educational adequacy
cases “import a wide spectrum of considerations and are admittedly
imprecise . . . they are not without content.”290 In Rose, the Kentucky
Supreme Court examined its constitution’s education clause which
simply provided, “[t]he General Assembly shall, by appropriate
legislation, provide for an efficient system of common schools
throughout the State.”291 The Rose court held that this constitutional
provision “requires the General Assembly to establish a system of
common schools that provides an equal opportunity for children to
have an adequate education.”292 It then articulated standards for
measuring compliance with the provision, which have been adopted
by numerous state courts across the country.293 Similarly, other state
supreme courts have concluded that discerning standards to
interpret their states’ education articles is well within their judicial
authority.294
289. Id. at 253–54.
290. Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 778
(Tex. 2005).
291. KY. CONST. § 183; Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186,
211 (Ky. 1989).
292. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211.
293. See Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1236 (Kan. 2014) (officially adopting
Rose standards and noting that other courts had done so); Claremont Sch. Dist. v.
Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) (“We view these guidelines as
benchmarks of a constitutionally adequate public education.”); McDuffy v. Sec’y of
the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 555 (Mass. 1993) (“These guidelines
accord with our Constitution’s emphasis on educating our children to become free
citizens on whom the [State] may rely to meet its needs and to further its interests.”).
294. See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254–55 (N.C. 1997) (following
Rose criteria for defining constitutional adequacy); Claremont Sch. Dist., 703 A.2d at
1359–60 (same); McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554 (same). See Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v.
State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999) (interpreting the constitution to require a
“minimally adequate education,” which includes “[1] the ability to read, write, and
speak the English language, and knowledge of mathematics and physical science;
[2] a fundamental knowledge of economic, social, and political systems, and of
history and governmental processes; and [3] academic and vocational skills.”);
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94–95 (Wash. 1978)
(identifying “broad educational concepts”—designed to allow students to
adequately participate in our political system, the labor market, and in the market
place of ideas—to guide the legislature in its duty to “make ample provision for the
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In school segregation cases, however, courts need not even
reach the question of whether devising new standards is appropriate.
That is because they are governed by robust preexisting standards,
developed to resolve precisely the problem at hand.295 These
standards have been laid out over the course of many U.S. Supreme
Court and other federal cases.296 More than being “discoverable and
manageable,”297 the judicial standards that govern school
desegregation played a key role in 20th and 21st century American
history.298 Likewise, federal law establishes a clear endpoint for
desegregation measures. Formerly de jure segregated school systems
are released from their constitutional burdens when they are
deemed unitary.299
There is, of course, one important distinction between the
standards used in federal and state school desegregation lawsuits: the
former is premised on allegations of intentional segregation, while
the latter need not be. However, this distinction is less significant
than it initially appears, due to the broad scope of the required
remedies in a federal desegregation suit.300 The Supreme Court’s
expansive school desegregation jurisprudence required the
elimination of any vestige of state-operated segregation in a dual
system, and would therefore, in many cases, require the elimination
of most segregation within that system.301 Consequently, the task
undertaken by a federal court resolving a desegregation claim is
unlikely to differ much in scope or scale from the task faced by a
state court. In both instances, the courts are being asked to achieve
a similar outcome: the eradication of segregation within a school
system.

education of all children”).
295. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430
(1968).
296. See supra note 295.
297. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 224 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
298. Karl A. Cole-Frieman, A Retrospective of Brown v. Board of Education: The
Ghosts of Segregation Still Haunt Topeka, Kansas: A Case Study on the Role of the Federal
Courts in School Desegregation, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 3 (1996).
299. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991);
Green, 391 U.S. at 430.
300. See supra Section III.A.
301. Id.
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Baker Factor #3 – Initial Policy Determination

The third Baker factor precludes a court from adjudicating a
case where it is impossible to decide the outcome “without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”302
Defendants in adequacy cases argue that measuring adequacy
through educational metrics, such as test scores and graduation
rates, requires courts to establish education policy.303 Some courts
worry that assessing whether states have “failed to provide an
adequate education would require [courts] to first determine the
applicable standard, which is ‘an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.’”304 Such a determination
“rests in educational policy and is entrusted to the legislature, and
not the judicial branch,” according to this line of reasoning.305
But there is a reason why the U.S. Supreme Court has not used
the third, rather obscure, Baker factor to dismiss a case on political
question grounds.306 Given the cases cited by the Court in Baker to
develop the six factor test,307 it would appear that the third factor
“means something other than a requirement that the political
branches identify and assign weight to broad policy considerations
relevant to the controversy” before determining entitlement to
relief.308 The more appropriate basis for the third factor is an inquiry
302. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
303. See Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191–92 (Ill. 1996)
(explaining that the case was nonjusticiable because the separation of powers
doctrine prohibits a court from making an “initial policy determination,” and the
court would not “presume to lay down guidelines or ultimatums for [the
legislature].”); Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017)
(“[Plaintiffs] attempt to gauge adequacy based on student-performance measures
such as standardized test scores and graduation rates[;] defining the necessary
qualitative standard inevitably requires the judiciary to establish educational
policy. . . .”).
304. Cruz-Guzman, 892 N.W.2d at 539 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
305. Id.
306. See Kimberly Breedon, Remedial Problems at the Intersection of the Political
Question Doctrine, the Standing Doctrine, and the Doctrine of Equitable Discretion, 34 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 523, 538 (2008) (finding that no Supreme Court case has used the third
factor to establish nonjusticiability).
307. See Ex parte Hitz, 111 U.S. 766 (1884) (holding that courts cannot recognize
diplomatic privilege until the executive determines diplomatic status); Doe v.
Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1850) (holding that courts cannot interpret
interests protected by a treaty until the executive branch first determines whether
such a treaty is in effect).
308. Breedon, supra note 306, at 539.
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into “whether a particular and discrete diplomatic determination by
a political branch about a party to, or a fact in, the specific
controversy . . . must be made before the court can decide the legal
issues.”309
As scholars have cautioned, “the third Baker factor is arguably
the one most susceptible to an overly broad application.”310 This
likely tendency toward broader application of the third Baker factor
is because courts recognize that “mak[ing] law or . . . extend[ing]
existing law beyond the limits of proper interpretation . . . is a
political responsibility, and whether to do so [is] a ‘political
question.’” 311 Application of the third factor is reserved for only
extreme cases, not the run-of-the-mill assessment of liability or
constitutionality.312 This is because the third Baker factor “requires
courts to evaluate whether it would be impossible to decide the case
without making an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
involving nonjudicial discretion.”313 In other words, “a political
question under the third factor exists when, to resolve a dispute, the
court must make a policy judgment of a legislative nature, rather
than resolving the dispute through legal and factual analysis.”314
Once again, though, these questions are simplified in the
instance of a school segregation claim. This is because one of the
most important policy judgments—the status of segregated schools
vis a vis integrated or racially diverse schools—is already settled, and
cannot be altered. All state courts are bound by Brown’s

309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 598
(1976).
312. In Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., for example, the court
found that the third Baker factor applied, only because “Plaintiffs are in effect asking
this Court to make a political judgment that the two dozen Defendants named in
this action should be the only ones to bear the cost of contributing to global
warming.” 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2009). By contrast, claims that are
merely political in nature but do not include any contradictory actions or statements
from the legislature or executive branches, do not rise to the level of a Baker factor
three application. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 438
F. Supp. 2d 291, 303–04 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
313. In re MTBE, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 301; In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.,
373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 71 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of
Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008).
314. Gross v. German Found. Indus. Initiative, 456 F.3d 363, 388 (3d Cir. 2006)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
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determination that racial segregation is inherently unequal.315 As a
matter of law, the inherent inequality of segregated schools is
binding and unbreakable: no “policy judgment of a legislative
nature” by state lawmakers can adjust that determination by the U.S.
Supreme Court.316
A simple statement of two schools’ inherent inequality is not
sufficient to fully resolve a segregation claim.317 But it gives courts a
starting point, rather than asking them to simply invent standards by
themselves. And to the extent that further determinations are
needed, the mere existence of Brown and its progeny undermines
the idea that “policy determinations” related to school segregation
are “of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”318 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has stated quite broadly the opposite: that when
faced with an actionable claim of racial segregation, “judicial
authority may be invoked,” and “the scope of a district court’s
equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and
flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”319 Surely this is no less
true when the wrong inflicted is a state’s failure, through
maintenance of a segregated school system, to fulfill a constitutional
duty or vindicate a fundamental right.
B.

Judicial Competence to Resolve Segregation Suits

The Baker v. Carr factors are not the end of the issue. State courts
may apply their own unique interpretations of justiciability doctrine,
and without clearly established standards, it is difficult to address
those situations hypothetically.320 However, one particular concern
315. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
316. See Gross, 456 F.3d at 388 (discussing how the third Baker factor is implicated
when courts are asked to make a “policy judgement of a legislative nature”).
317. Peter M. Shane, Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 1041, 1050 (1984) (discussing how the harms cited in Brown should
only be a “starting point for analysis and [one must] take account also of subsequent
research into the nature of racial inequality”).
318. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (holding that school desegregation is a justiciable
issue); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (discussing the third Baker
factor: “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion”).
319. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
320. See generally Hershkoff, supra note 183, at 1844. (discussing how the courts
in some states “undertake and discharge functions that are conventionally deemed
beyond the Article III power, functions that commentators often characterize as
essentially nonjudicial because they are outside understood limits on judicial
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often seems to underlie the application of the political question
doctrine to educational adequacy claims, and that concern can be
addressed.321
Scholars who have written on the intersection of the political
question doctrine and educational adequacy have noted that
dismissals seem to be rooted in underlying worries about a court’s
“institutional competence” to adjudicate complex policy issues.322
The resolution of a school finance case could require a court to delve
into the intricacies of funding formulas, research on educational
evaluation, or the minute details of municipal finance. Accepting
this obligation can immerse courts in what might seem like an
unwanted quagmire.323
Recent trends in some adequacy cases may be exacerbating the
problem.324 A 2010 article wondered if judges’ concerns with
particular litigation strategies—especially “specific monetary
demands” and “increasing[] focus[] on appropriations as the
benchmark and remedy”—was behind several recent justiciability
dismissals by state courts.325 The article argued that these ultraspecific litigation demands were pushing courts away from their
“traditional judicial role”:326 declaring a system unconstitutional and
allowing legislatures an opportunity to enact a remedy before
proactively intervening.327
capacity”).
321. Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 13, at 118.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 117–18 (explaining how challenges to school finance systems can
overburden courts with extensive litigation).
324. Id. at 88 (“Although adequacy suits have done much to increase funding,
improve schools, and draw attention to the children left behind by the political
process, courts looking to other states also see interminable litigation, ever-growing
demands from plaintiffs, and tension-fraught showdowns between the judiciary and
legislatures.”).
325. Id. at 88–90.
326. Id. at 88.
327. For example, shortly after Minnesota’s recent segregation case was
dismissed by a state court of appeals on justiciability grounds, a second adequacy
suit reached the same court. Forslund v. State, No. 62-CV-16-2161, 2017 WL 3864082
(Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2017). This second case used Minnesota’s constitutional
education provisions to attack the state’s teacher tenure law, making the very
specific claim that teacher tenure statutes unconstitutionally burden the right to an
adequate education. Id. at *1. It, too, was dismissed on justiciability grounds, with
the court pointing out that resolution of the claim would require it to, among other
things, “defin[e] both what an effective teacher is and what level or prevalence of
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At first blush, educational adequacy cases that focus on
segregation raise similar concerns. Remedies are sure to be elaborate
and require development of a certain degree of expertise.328
Segregation cases are also sure to be lengthy—no dual school system
has ever been eliminated in a month.329
But the long legacy of school desegregation litigation should
help inoculate such cases against the greatest worries of this nature.
Unlike virtually every other case dealing with school conditions,
desegregation lawsuits can safely build off Brown’s definitive
statement that segregated schools are inherently unequal.330 And if
segregation cases require expertise, it is expertise courts have
demonstrated themselves to possess over the course of hundreds of
federal lawsuits.331 Prior segregation cases also provide a reasonable,
time-tested pathway for gradually escalating intervention. First, an
instruction to the relevant educational authorities to correct the
offending condition; only if they fail to do so would a court typically
take jurisdiction and intervene more directly.332 Moreover, even in
the event that court-directed remedies become necessary, there is
much national experience with this type of remedy.333 A court
resolving a segregation case, unlike a court resolving other
educational adequacy claims, need not worry about its remedial
efforts stumbling into some heretofore unknown usurpation of
legislative power.334 Instead, it will be walking well-trodden ground,
ineffectiveness in teaching represents an inadequate education.” Id. at *3.
328. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 101, at 1187 (analyzing 126 written opinions
regarding court-ordered desegregation for 138 school districts).
329. Id.
330. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S 483, 495 (1954).
331. One 2000 study, looking at just three federal judicial districts in the South,
found 192 districts covered by desegregation orders. Parker, supra note 101, at 1187.
332. See, e.g., Stell v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 860 F. Supp. 1563, 1564–66 (S.D. Ga.
1994) (describing the court’s instructions and subsequent involvement in a
desegregation plan).
333. See, e.g., Robert E. Buckholz, Jr., et al., The Remedial Process in Institutional
Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 799–800 (1978) (illustrating the remedial
approach of “remedial abstention,” in which defendants are permitted to develop
their own remedies, before eventual appointment of a court expert as a pressure
mechanism to encourage compliance (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971))). See generally Zelden, supra note 74, at 471 (describing
the gradual development of new proactive desegregation remedies by district
courts).
334. See, e.g., Zelden, supra note 74, at 528 (“[I]t was the federal courts that
ultimately shaped the desegregation process: setting standards, promoting
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with well-drawn boundaries.335 In short, the judicial branch has been
doing this sort of thing for a very long time.336 It has previously been
asked to—and did—retain jurisdiction for years by monitoring,
approving, or requiring changes in virtually every area of school
operations.337 Courts can surely do this sort of thing again, even if
the initial claims are marginally different.
As a practical matter, from the perspective of plaintiffs, it would
be faintly absurd for a court, faced with one allegation of
segregation, to take jurisdiction and institute a far-reaching series of
changes, and then, faced with a slightly different allegation of
segregation, to dismiss the case, disclaiming the whole problem as
outside its purview. If plaintiffs’ right to integrated schools in a
unitary system could be vindicated before, surely it can be vindicated
now.
VI. CONCLUSION
Time and again, the court system has been called to uphold
constitutional rights guaranteeing equal and adequate education.338
First, these battles were waged primarily in federal courts, and fought
over intentional segregation. Then, they moved into state courts and
were fought over financing and funding.339 Now, there may be an
opportunity to combine these two trends, and, using the guarantees
of state constitutions, fulfill the promise of integrated schools in
places where desegregation was never completed or never took in
the first place.
By and large, courts have accepted the burden of acting as the
guarantor of constitutional education requirements.340 School
segregation poses a burden of a different sort—perhaps a much

methods, integrating the efforts of other agencies, and ultimately, judging success
or failure.”).
335. See id.; see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 20–31 (1971) (addressing a wide range of
allowable remedies in school desegregation lawsuits).
336. See Zelden, supra note 74 (describing the judicial branch’s work in
desegregation from the years 1968–1974 and expressing the effects of which are still
felt in current day).
337. See Swann, 402 U.S., at 18–21 (discussing several judicial holdings as to
various aspects of school operations).
338. See Parker, supra note 101, at 1187 (describing an empirical study of
hundreds of judicial orders involving desegregation for schools in the South).
339. See supra Part II.B.
340. See supra Part I.A.
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larger one. But the American judicial branch’s long history of
pursuing the unification of formerly divided school districts proves
that the judicial system is equal to the challenge.341 Courts should
recognize the justiciability of state law segregation claims and accept
that challenge.

341. See, e.g., Dennis G. Terez, Protecting the Remedy of Unitary Schools, 37 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 41, 70 (1986) (“In 1955, the Supreme Court concluded that the
appropriate remedy [to remedy constitutional wrong inflicted upon minority
groups] was to be unitary schools. . . . The racially identifiable schools of a dual
system have been largely eliminated, so we now have neither ‘black’ schools nor
‘white’ schools but just schools.”).
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